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Introduction

The RAVE Act' was designed to thwart use and distribution of
the illegal street drug ecstasy by holding the owner of a nightclub or
other venue criminally responsible for any illegal drug-related
activities that occur at an electronic music 2 concert held on his or her
property. Congress' goal in passing the RAVE Act was to curtail
ecstasy use by eliminating electronic music concerts and raves in
much the same way that crack houses could be shut down: by holding
the property owners liable for crack use that took place on the
property.

1. See H.R. 718, 108th Cong. (2003). The acronym RAVE stands for Reducing
Americans' Vulnerability to Ecstasy; see also S.226, 108th Cong. §§ 1-4 (2003) (enacted).
2. For lack of a better term, this Article will refer to the music found at both
electronic music concerts and raves as electronic music. The music is also referred to as
techno or dance music. There are also many sub-genres, the details of which are outside
the scope of this Article. See generally JIMI FRITZ, RAVE CULTURE: AN INSIDER'S
OVERVIEW (SmallFry Press 1999) [hereinafter FRITZ]; MIREILLE SILCoTr, RAVE
AMERICA: NEW SCHOOL DANCESCAPES (ECW Press 1999).
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A rave is, in general, a party or a concert featuring electronic
music usually accompanied by dancing. While no statutory definition
of a rave exists, the legislative history of the RAVE Act, as proposed

in 2002, indicates that Congress was targeting two different types of
raves.3 The first type of rave identified by Congress is "held in a dance
club with only a handful of people in attendance. ''4 The second type

of rave is "held at a temporary venue such as a warehouse, open field
or empty building and has tens of thousands of people present."5 For
purposes of this Article and for clarity, the former will be referred to

as an electronic music concert and the latter as a rave. There is also a
third type of concert Congress did not identify: a large-scale event
featuring electronic music that is held in a large venue such as a sports
arena or an amphitheater.6 This type of event will also be referred to

in this Article as an electronic music concert, as the main difference
between a rave and an electronic music concert is that a rave is
usually "underground," unlicensed and unregulated; an electronic

music concert is "mainstream" and held in venues that are licensed
and regulated by the city7 (and sometimes state) in which the concert
takes place.

II. The History of Raves and Ecstasy'
Use of the club drug ecstasy was popular in New York City's gay
male nightclubs in the early 1980s. British disc jockeys ("DJs") and
performers who visited these New York nightclubs returned to
England endorsing use of the drug, and ecstasy was introduced at
electronic music concerts and raves throughout England.9 The English

3. See S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
4. Id.
5. Id.

6. Denver promoter Jason Bills [says] "I think it's ridiculous to assume that the sole
reason I'm doing an event at the Denver Coliseum is so that people can do drugs. We do
parties in convention centers and places where professional sports teams are playing, and
we'd like to be held to the same standards as any other concert promoter." Jenny Eliscu,
The War on Raves, ROLLING STONE, May 24, 2001, at 21-22.
7. See infra Part IX.A.

8. The author has made a good faith effort to trace the history of raves, electronic
music concerts and the illegal street drug ecstasy. However, since these phenomena are an

"underground" subculture and the stuff of which urban legends are made, there may be
inconsistencies or alternate explanations for the research in this part of the Article. The
author takes full responsibility for any such inconsistencies.
9. See Julie Holland, M.D., Ecstasy: A History, in ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE
GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF MDMA 17 (Julie
Holland, M.D. ed., Park Street Press 2001); see also Utopian Pharmacology, BLTC
Research, availableat http://mdma.net (last visited June 5, 2004).
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electronic music phenomenon, in turn, was re-introduced to the
United States by New York DJ and electronic music promoter

Frankie Bones, who began throwing warehouse parties in the outer
boroughs of New York in 1989.0 Since then, electronic music has
become popular throughout the country.1
A. "Rave Culture," MDMA and Ecstasy
1. Rave Culture
In the RAVE Act as proposed in 2002, Congress found that the
"trafficking
and
use
of
'club
drugs,'
including
3,4-

methylenedioxymethampethamine... is deeply embedded in the rave
culture.'

2

Some rave attendees are drug free; some are not. A recent

clinical survey of electronic music concerts held in nightclubs in the
United States found that 30% of participants tested positive for 3,4methylenedioxymethampethamine ("MDMA") using a testing device
called the ORALscreen.TM"3 In another, 20% tested positive for
ecstasy by saliva analysis. 4 A recent, more encouraging German study
indicates that ecstasy use is a transient, youthful phenomenon that
people quickly outgrow once they reach their twenties. 15 British use of
ecstasy is falling dramatically, 6 as is ecstasy use here in the United
States. 7 This Article does not argue that there is no correlation
10. See Holland, supra note 9, at 17. This is one theory on the birth of the rave
phenomenon. Other urban legends will state that the "scene" began in San Francisco,
Chicago or other cities, but the main idea is that the music began in the United States, was
exported to England where it became associated with ecstasy, and then returned to
various cities in the United States.
11. See generally FRITZ, supra note 2; see also ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE,
supra note 9, at 16-18 (providing a concise overview of the different subgenres of
electronic music that have become popular in different regions of the country).
12 See S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (Finding No. 3).
13. See generally George S. Yacoubian, Jr., et. al., Estimating the Prevalence of
Ecstasy Use Among Club Rave Attendees, 31 CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS 168
(Spring 2004).
14. See Amelia M. Arria et al., Ecstasy Use Among Club Rave Attendees, reprintedin
156
ADOLESCENT
MEDICINE
(Arch
Pediatrics
2002),
available
at
http://www.archpediatrics.com.
15. See Kirsten von Sydow et al., Use, Abuse and Dependence of Ecstasy and Related
Drugs in Adolescents and Young Adults - A Transient Phenomenon? Results From a
LongitudinalStudy, 66 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 147-59 (2002).
16. See David McCandless, Goodbye Ecstasy, Hello 5-Meo-DMT: New Designer
Drugs Are Just a Click Away; Psychedelics Legal in US but Banned in UK Are Openly
Available on the Internet,availableat http://mdma.net/uk (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
17. Press Release, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Teen Ecstasy Use Cut by 25
Percent From Peak as Trend Reverses; Three-Quartersof a Million Fewer Teens Using
"Love Drug" (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org; Press Release, The

20061

THE RAVE Acr

between electronic music and ecstasy use. This Article does argue

that the RAVE Act is not narrowly tailored to the government's
concededly compelling interest in battling ecstasy distribution and is
therefore unconstitutional.
As noted in the introduction, there are two types of electronic
music concerts: the first one is smaller and usually held in a nightclub;
the second type is larger and usually held in an arena. Typically, an

electronic music concert in a nightclub costs between five thousand
and sixty thousand dollars to produce." This type of event usually
features at least one international, headlining DJ and several
secondary talents from within the country or the local area.' 9 The

promoter of this type of event typically circulates a flyer in advance,
finds an appropriate venue that already has the licenses and permits
necessary for holding an electronic music concert of this size, and
often seeks "advance support from City Hall or the police department

in an effort to minimize any problems."2 ° The owner of the venue
typically does not seek out such a party promoter, but if the promoter
approaches the business owner with a profit-making proposal, the
owner will usually agree to allow his property to be used for this
specialized type of event.21
The second type of electronic music concert is a very large event,22
held in a stadium or similar venue like any other large concert.
Events such as these cost anywhere from one to five hundred
thousand dollars to produce and they require administration by a
well-financed, sophisticated and responsible organization to
administrate. 2 They feature internationally acclaimed DJs and crowds
ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. 24 The

University of Michigan, Ecstasy Use Falls For Second Year in a Row, Overall Teen Drug
Use Drops (Dec. 19,2003), availableat http://www.monitoringthefuture.org.
l& See FRITZ, supra note 2, at 108.
19. Id. at 109.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Reducing Americans' Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of 2002: Hearing on
HR. 5519 Before the House Subcomnm. on Crime, Terrorism and HomelandSecurity of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) (testimony of Graham Boyd,
Director, Drug Policy Litigation Project, American Civil Liberties Union). According to
Boyd, "Robert Brunet manages the State Palace Theater in New Orleans ....Mr. Brunet
hired James Estopinal to arrange and promote electronic music concerts.... "Id.
22 See FRITZ, supra note 2, at 111-13.
23. See FRITZ, supra note 2, at 111; Eliscu, supra note 6. Denver promoter Jason Bills
has staged "major events without incident since 1993, investing six-figure budgets in
productions that feature everyone from underground house kingpin Armand Van Helden
to DJ Jazzy Jeff." Id.
24. See FRITZ, supra note 2, at 111-12.
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venues used are usually large sports centers and arenas and, as with
large sporting events, organizers are increasingly seeking sponsorship
from major companies such as Coca-Cola, Sony and Camel
Cigarettes.25 Like the small business owner, the owner of a large
venue is similarly open to holding these types of events, provided they
are profitable. Thus, these large-scale electronic music concerts are
very similar to large-scale rock concerts, the only difference being
that the performers are creating a different style of music.
The second type of event Congress cited in the legislative history
to the RAVE Act, the true rave, is typically held in a temporary
venue like a warehouse, open field or empty building and has tens of
thousands of people present.26 These true raves are underground
events and, because they are not subject to any sort of regulation, are
much more likely to be the sites of drug use or distribution. Such
events, unlike an electronic music concert, are less likely to have
security or other protective measures. 2'
2. MDMA
The drug trafficking that Congress hopes to curtail by shutting
down electronic music concerts is that of the street drug ecstasy, the
pure form of which is MDMA. MDMA was originally patented by the
Merck Pharmaceutical Company in 1914 after company scientists
stumbled upon it while attempting to create a new medication to stop
bleeding.2 As usual, the process of its synthesis was patented, 29 but
Merck did not mention any use for MDMA in its patent application.
The chemical formula for this drug lay dormant until it was
rediscovered in the early 1970s by chemist Alexander Shulgin, 3° who
introduced MDMA to some of his colleagues. 3' Through Shulgin's
contacts, in the 1970s, a group of Northern California
psychotherapists began giving MDMA to patients in therapy. 32
Psychotherapist Ann Shulgin called it "penicillin for the soul." 33 These
25. See FRITZ, supranote 2, at 103.
26. S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
27. See FRITZ, supra note 2, at 104. A policy of targeting these events would be more
narrowly tailored to the goal of eliminating ecstasy distribution.
28. See DRUG IDENTIFICATION BIBLE 765 (Amera-Chem, Inc. 2001); ECSTASY: THE
COMPLETE GUIDE, supra note 9, at 11.
29. See Holland, supra note 9, at 11.
30. See id. at 12.
31. Id.
32 Id.
33. Id. at 16. The private psychotherapists in the United States who were using
MDMA in their clinical practice called it "Adam," an allusion to "being returned to the
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therapists did not publish their findings on the use of MDMA in a
clinical setting and the public did not become widely aware of this use
of the drug until the San Francisco Chronicle published a story about

it in June of 1984. 34
By the early 1980s, the height of the crack cocaine epidemic,
MDMA had appeared on the recreational drug scene. A group of
entrepreneurs in Texas began selling MDMA, under the brand name
Sassyfras,3 5 over the phone and at certain nightclubs in Dallas 3 and

Forth Worth, where over-the-counter sales were subject to tax. 7 The
tax revenue from this MDMA-fueled nightlife attracted the attention
of Senator Lloyd Bentson, who urged the Drug Enforcement

Administration ("DEA") to make the drug illegal under the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970.8
The DEA held hearings in February, June and July of 1985, at
which therapists testified as to the unique ability of MDMA to

catalyze the therapeutic process and to enhance communication
between spouses, family members and therapist and patient.39 In 1988,

ignoring this testimony, the Drug Enforcement Administration
classified MDMA as a Schedule

1

4

drug, defined by the DEA as

natural state of innocence before guilt, shame and unworthiness arose." See Holland,
supra note 9, at 13. An anonymous street drug dealer claims that the name ecstasy was
chosen mainly for marketing reasons. Id. The person who allegedly named the drug has
explained that "ecstasy was chosen for obvious reasons, because it would sell better than
calling it empathy. Id. Empathy would be more appropriate, but how many people know
what it means?" Id; see also http://mdma.net (last visited June 5, 2004).
34. See Holland, supra note 9, at 13; see also NICHOLAS SAUNDERS, E IS FOR
ECSTASY, ch.3 n.141, available at http://www.ecstasy.org/books/e4x/e4x.ch.03.html (last
visited June 5, 2004). It appears that these psychotherapists, like Shulgin, were
synthesizing the MMA themselves in basement laboratories or other clandestine
locations. These therapists believed that "no therapist has the right to give a psychoactive
drug to another person unless and until he is thoroughly familiar with its effects on his own
mind ....Id.
35. The essential oil of sassafras is "the major natural precursor in the synthesis of
MDMA." See Holland, supra note 9, at 8.
36. In Dallas, where alcohol was prohibited at the Southern Methodist University,
students bought legal MDMA as a substitute, paying by credit card. See
http://www.alb2c3.com/drugs/x_01.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
37. See Holland, supra note 9, at 13.
3& See Holland, supra note 9, at 15.
39. On behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Dr. Lewis Seiden of the
University of Chicago presented data on MDA, a different drug that is a chemical relative
of MDMA. It remains unclear as to why the DEA presented evidence about a different
drug. After all of the evidence was presented, Judge Francis Young recommended to the
Drug Enforcement Administration that MDMA be placed in Schedule III, which would
allow clinical work and research to proceed. See Holland, supra note 9, at 15.
40. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2004). The statute states, in
relevant part:
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having high potential for abuse and no medical value. Most recently,
MDMA was approved by the Food and Drug Administration for

medical study on human test subjects in 2001.42 These clinical trials
are expected to begin soon. 43

3. Ecstasy
The street drug ecstasy is not pure MDMA. Makers of street

ecstasy often add other stimulants to enhance the effects of their
product." The effects of ecstasy can be very similar to those of
MDMA, the key ingredient. Psychotherapist R.D. Laing, who took
pure MDMA at Esalen, California in 1984 when it was still legal, said:
"It made me feel how all of us would like to feel we are anyway...

smooth and open hearted, not soggy, sentimental or stupid." 45 The
most familiar emotion experienced is that of being in love, 46 and the
most predictable feelings experienced are those of empathy,
openness, peace and caring. 47 Users are affected emotionally for
usually four to six hours, and freely hug and touch one another.48
Their visual perception and sense of time may be altered. 49 Typically,
(1) Schedule I. (A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance
under medical supervision.
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2004).
41. Once a drug is classified as Schedule I, it is no longer available either by
prescription or over the counter. See 21 U.S.C. § 829 (2004).
42. A South Carolina psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Mithoefer, "plans to conduct
psychotherapy sessions with 20 women who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder due
to sexual assaults or other violence, and who haven't been helped by other treatment."
See, e.g., http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH102/25/ecstasy.study/ (last visited June 5,
2004). Twelve of the women will be given MDMA; eight will be given a placebo. The
study was finally approved by the DEA on February 24, 2004. Mithoefer says he has
extensive experience in working with post-traumatic stress disorder patients and he's
"excited about the possibility of finding a better treatment for the hundreds of thousands
of Americans who suffer from the sometimes debilitating disorder." Id.
43.

Id.

44. DRUG IDENTIFICATION BIBLE, supra note 28, at 767-68.
45. See NICHOLAS SAUNDERS, E IS FOR ECSTASY ch.4 n.3, n.25, available at
http://www.ecstasy.org/books/e4x/e4x.ch.04.html (last visited June 5, 2004).
46. Id. at n.132.
47. Id. at n.166. Note that a person's experience with MIDMA or ecstasy can vary
from paranoia to sleep, depending greatly on other factors called 'set and setting' which
includes the person's cultural beliefs, expectations and state of mind at the time. Even
genetic make up may affect the experience. Id. at n.178.
48 See DRUG IDENTIFICATION BIBLE, supra note 28, at 769.
49. Id.
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the user will feel that "all is right with the world."' The psychological

effects of ecstasy are typically much more pronounced than the
physical ones."
The most common physical effects caused by ecstasy use include
hyperthermia and dehydration caused by elevated body temperatures
combined with physical exertion.52 The long term effects of ecstasy
use are still unknown. While some scientific results and studies

suggest that heavy ecstasy use can cause long-term brain damage,
much more research is needed to conclusively determine ecstasy's
clinical effects.53 Counterfeit ecstasy pills containing stimulants such as
ephedrine, phenylpropanolamine (PPA), caffeine, atropine and/or
glyceryl guaiacolate are sold on the street as pure MDMA, and are

believed to be responsible for, or involved in, a number of ecstasy
overdoses. 5' The added chemicals can cause permanent brain damage
or even death.55
Over the past few years, the federal government has recognized a
threat to the public safety in ecstasy use and launched law
enforcement measures targeting the drug.56 Senator Biden cited the
death of a 17-year-old girl5 7 at a party in New Orleans as the catalyst

to an assessment of raves (defined in this Article as electronic music
concerts) in New Orleans, conducted by the Drug Enforcement
Administration that showed a "close relationship5 18 between raves
and club-drug overdoses.59 In a two-year period, 52 electronic music

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Holland, supra note 9, at 55.
54. See John A. Henry, M.D. & Joseph G. Rella, M.D., Medical Risks Associated
With MDMA Use, in ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE, supra note 11, at 71-2.
55. See Matthew Baggott, M.D., & John Mendelson, M.D., Does MDMA Cause
Brain Damage?, in ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE, supra note 11, at 110-45; Holland,
supra note 9, at 55; SAUNDERS, E ISFOR ECSTASY ("The most likely danger from taking
[e]cstasy
is
consuming
something
else
instead")
available
at
http://www.ecstasy.org/books/e4x/e4x.ch.06.html (last visited June 5, 2004).
56. See, e.g., Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 290aa-5b); Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21,117
Stat. 691; Ecstasy Awareness Act, H.R. 2962, 108th Cong. (2003); Clean, Learn, Educate,
Abolish, Neutralize and Undermine Production (CLEAN-UP) of Methamphetamines
Act, H.R. 834, 108th Cong. (2003).
57. The girl was seventeen-year-old Jillian Kirkland of Monroeville, Alabama. See
John Cloud, Ecstasy Crackdown: Will the Feds Use a 1980s Anti-Crack Law to Destroy the
Rave Movement? TIME, Apr. 9,2001, at 62-3.
58. 148 CONG. REC. S5706 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).
59. Id.
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6
concerts were held at the State Palace Theater in New Orleans, 0

which has a capacity of 3,000 people. 6 During that same period,
approximately 400 teenagers were treated at local emergency rooms
for overdosing on drugs.62 Yet the government later stipulated at the
trial of the venue's owners and manager that only 30-40 overdoses
may have been related to the events held at the State Palace
4

Theater. 63 Reports of ecstasy overdoses may be grossly exaggerated.

B. Electronic Music
The Department of Justice has called raves "high energy, allnight dance parties... which feature dance music with a fast,
pounding beat and choreographed laser programs." ' Whether a
legitimate electronic music concert or an underground rave, the
acknowledged focal points66 of the event are the music and the dance.
This section of the Article will examine how innovations in
technology have changed the way music is produced and consumed,
and the significance of these technological changes to live
performances, culminating in a new breed of modern artist: the DJ.
In the West, before the arrival of early music technology-the
cylinder, the gramophone, the phonograph or the player pianomusic was conceptually associated with two primary concrete forms:
"an audible event (a performance) or a written prescription for such
an event (a score, a lead sheet, or some other kind of manuscript
containing musical notation)." 67 The artist who played the written

60. Id.
61. See htpp://www.socialweb.net/Places/3410.lasso (last visited Mar. 12, 2005) and
http://www.lavela.com/aboutus/info.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005). New Orleans' State
Palace Theatre has a capacity of 3,500; Florida's Club La Vela, (the largest nightclub in the
country) has a capacity of 6,000. Both venues' owners were prosecuted under the
Crackhouse statute because somewhere in their vast confines, it was charged, people were
using drugs.
62. 148 CONG. REc. S5706 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden); see
also Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of
Justice,
No.
2001-L0424-004,
April
2001,
at
4,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
63. See supra note 21.
64. See infra notes 396-97.
65. Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of
Justice,
No.
2001-L0424-004,
April
2001,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
66. Id.
67. Kai Fikentscher, There's Not A Problem I Can't Fix, 'Cause I Can Do It In the
Mix: On the Performance Technology of 12-Inch Vinyl, in Music AND TECHNOCULTURE
291 (Ren6 T.A. Lysloff & Leslie C. Gay, Jr. eds., 2003).
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score on his musical instrument was called the performer. 6 The artist

who wrote the written score, or musical notations, was called the
composer. 69 Innovations in technology have, over time, blurred the
lines between these two distinct categories.7 °
1. New Technologies
The advent of computerized keyboards in the 1950s allowed one
musician to create complex rhythms and harmonies that previously
required a whole ensemble of musicians.7' The multitrack tape

recorder, also an invention of the 1950s,72 was a momentous event for
music history. From that point on, a recording no longer necessarily
documented a performance at all.73 Instead, it was a new type of
musical manuscript, a "sonic score. ' 7 4 Like the keyboard, the tape
recorder eliminated the need for the composer to muster an ensemble
orchestra. 75 Put another way, the recorded music could now reflect an
illusionary performance.76 For example, ensemble instruments could

now be recorded individually, in sequence, and then be balanced with
each other in a final mix, which represented a performance that had
never really taken place. 77
A classic example of this trend is the material recorded in a
studio for the Beatles' landmark album Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts

68 See Leonard Kasdan & Jon H. Appleton, Tradition and Change: The Case of
Music, 12 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 50,58 (1970).
69. Id.
70. See KAI FIKENTSCHER, "You BETrER WORK!" UNDERGROUND DANCE MUSIC
IN NEW YORK CITY 91 (2000); ERIC SALZMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC: AN
INTRODUCTION 235 (H. Wiley Hitchcock ed., Prentice Hall 2002) (1967); see generally
Leonard Kasdan & Jon H. Appleton, Tradition and Change: The Case of Music, 12
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 50 (1970).
pianofortelDerComputer als Klavier [The
71. See Emilio Ghezzi, II Computer come il
Computer as a Piano], 5 ANNALI DI SOCIOLOGIAISOzIOLOGISCHES JAHRBUCH 205
(1989). Note that some genres (e.g., rock) lend themselves more easily to electronic
instruments; classical music does not. Like the piano, the computerized keyboard is simply
an instrument; ultimately, its musical and popular success depends on the talent of the
musicians who use it. Id.
72. See SALZMAN, supra note 70, at 151.
73. See, e.g., Fikentscher, supra note 67 at 292-4; SALZMAN, supra note 70, at 33-34;
Leonard Kasdan & Jon H. Appleton, Tradition and Change: The Case of Music, 12
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 50 (1970) (predicting that these new
technologies would cause this effect).
74. See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 293; see also FRANK TIRRO, JAZZ: A HISTORY
139 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993).
75. See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 292-93
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Club Band, material that was impossible for its authors to perform
onstage after the album was released in 1967.78 The Beatles, called
"true children of the electronic age," 79 used recording technologies to
mix English music hall music with other styles such as swing, rockand-roll and classical chamber music, to make it their own.80 Their
later recordings 8' have been called a move "toward larger forms and
concepts; these albums are not just collections of songs but have
larger overall artistic and theatrical shape." Although the Beatles
scored their initial successes as a live performing group,s3 it was the
recording technologies that became the main instrument on which
they played."
Another new "instrument" that has revolutionized the way we
think about music is the DJ console or "set,"'' which typically consists
of at least two turntables, a mixer and a pair of headphones. In the
1970s, DJs did not work in recording studios but in bars, clubs, and6
patrons.8
discotheques, where they were in direct contact with their
Like "the swing band leaders of the 1930s, disco [DJs] engaged with
their dancing clientele directly and dynamically."7 But "instead of
playing saxophones or brass riffs on the bandstand, they played
records, and used turntables, mixers and amplifiers to create music
that, although based on sounds created, arranged and recorded by
others, became ultimately 'theirs. ' '' 8
Today, rock and jazz ensembles, DJs and other performers with
strong experimental or artistic points of view have come almost
invariably to rely on synthesizers and other instruments that can
provide electronic sound modification, whether as an enhancement to
live performances or to create unique music wholly within the
recording studio.89 Thus, these new technologies have changed the
ways in which music is created and appreciated.
7& Id. at 293.
79. See SALZMAN,supra note 70, at 234.
80. Id. at 234-5.
81. These recordings include albums such as Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band

(1967) and Abbey Road (1969). Id. at 235.
82
83.

Id.
Id.

84. Id.
85. See FIKENTSCHER, supranote 70, at 36; see also infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
86. See Fikentscher, supranote 67, at 294.
87. Id.
8& Id.
89. See SALZMAN, supra note 70, at 154.
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2. The DJ as Maestro of Electronic Music
The chief significance of the DJ's role in the creation of
electronic music lies in the fact that the composer is "communicating
directly with his audience without an intermediary."9 In the context
of an electronic music concert, a mix refers to the blending of records
and perhaps sound effects, accomplished by the DJ with less
sophisticated equipment (than that of a recording studio) and in real
'' 2
time. 91 "A DJ's live performance then actually constitutes a 'remix,
the term the DJ uses, for his own live mix using vinyl recordings that
have been previously mixed in the recording studio. 93 In that sense, a
studio mix is comparable to a written score like those of classical
Western music and the DJ's remix is his own interpretation of that
composition. This is how "musical authorship has become a
temporary and subjective issue." 94
a) DJ as Composer-Performer 9'
The "approach of a composer to electronic music is in many
respects radically different" from the approach of a composer to
instrumental music. Although technology has simplified many of his
tasks, it has also placed greater responsibilities upon the composer.97
He now knows that his work involves "not only the conception" 98 but
also the performance of the composition.9
Even as radio and film sound technologies evolved in the 1920s
and 1930s, and recorded music became abundant, both radio and film
continued to present the music as if it were a live broadcast, or a
"make-believe concert. ' °° Finally, innovative radio DJs such as Jack
90. See Kasdan & Appleton, supra note 68, at 55.
91. See FIKENTSCHER, supra note 70, at 49.
92 Id.
93.

Id.

94. See id. at 50. This is not to say that a composition performed live by a DJ could
not be recorded at the site of the concert (something that is often done for commercial
purposes with many types of music, but which is beyond the scope of this Article).
95. This discussion focuses almost exclusively on the technologies preferred by DJs.
The use of more modem technologies, such as MP3 players, is beyond the scope of this
Article. For an excellent practical guide to composing and performing music using digital
(as opposed to analog) technologies, see generally CHARLES DODGE & THOMAS A.
JERSE, COMPUTER MUSIC: SYNTHESIS,

COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE

1997).
96. See Kasdan & Appleton, supra note 68, at 54.
97. Id.
9& Id.
99. Id.

100. See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 292-3.

(2d ed.
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Cooper and Martin Block began to present the recordings not as
"make-believe concerts"; 1 instead, they incorporated records into
2
their radio shows as basic elements for their own performances.'
Likewise, DJs in discotheques later used vinyl recordings to form the

basis of their own creative individual musical expression. 03 Today,
these vinyl recordings (or records) are as indispensable to the DJ's
musical instruments (turntables, mixers, equalizers) as strings are to
violinists, harpists and guitarists.mO
While the DJ is usually both the composer and performer, it is
the DJ who has great skill in composition who achieves more artistic
success than those who possess only good technical skills. The
compositional skills, called "programming" ' m by DJs, are "an art that

can include a range of musical considerations."""W Programming
encompasses the overall duration of a night of uninterrupted music
for dancing with its "slow and gradual increase of energy at the
beginning, the pacing toward one or several peaks that find their
ultimate release in that last record,"' ' followed by silence at the end

101. Id.
102. See id. at 292.
103. Id. Among the DJ's creative choices are the musical repertoire; the technology
used to play music for dancing; the techniques used to play, mix and remix records into the
flow of one musical performance; and the rapport and interaction between DJ and
dancers. Id. Today's club DJs usually use two or more turntables, an audio mixer, and two
separate amplification systems that will reach both the dance floor and the DJ booth. Id.
at 298. Together, these form the console. Id. The coordination of two or more turntables
and a mixer necessitates using the cross-fader control on the mixer to control the flow and
balance of two (or more) separate audio signal feeds. At the same time, in addition to
other optional considerations, the DJ must simultaneously control the tempo, volume, and
balance of timbres and textures; these skills are as crucial in the context of an electronic
music concert as they are with any other type of musical composition. Id. at 299.
104. See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 295.
105. See id. at 300. As Paradise Garage, New York DJ Larry Levan put it,
When I listen to DJs today they don't mean anything to me. Technically some of
them are excellent-emotionally they don't do anything for me ....There is
actually a message in the dance, the way you feel, the muscles you use, but only
certain records have that.
106. See FIKENTSCHER, supra note 70, at 41.
107. Id.
108. It is passages such as the above that lead some people who are unfamiliar with
electronic music to assume that electronic music lovers must be on drugs. Compare the
above excerpt, taken from KAI FIKENTSCHER, "You BETTER WORK!" UNDERGROUND
DANCE MUSIC IN NEW YORK CTY 41 (2000) with the following excerpt from ROBERT
JOURDAIN, Music, THE BRAIN AND ECSTASY: How Music CAPTURES OUR
IMAGINATION 331 (1997), in which the author does not refer to the illegal street drug
ecstasy in his book at all. Rather, referring to the joyful experience of listening to beautiful
music, he says:
When music transports us to the threshold of ecstasy, we behave almost like drug
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of the performance.'" Through the creative mixing of music recorded
on vinyl and the various means of playback technology, DJs have
become musical authors, producing their own interpretations of
prerecorded music, not only through the choice of repertoire but also
through their style of mixing."1 °
In addition to the compositional skills, a good DJ must also
possess the technical "mixing" skills."' The DJ, starting in the early
days of radio in the 1920s, and especially since the disco era of the
1970s, has played a crucial role in the process of redefining the role of
music technologies. 2 This process has been marked by a shift of
emphasis away from the composition of written scores and toward the
creation of new performance modes."" 3 The DJ, then, is arguably a
"visionary figure',1 4 who has helped bridge the transition from the
analog to the digital era by taking the turntable and sampler,
originally considered recording tools, and turning them into
performance instruments."' This "new virtuosity ' ' 16 is not "mere
' 7
embellishment but an organic part of the musical substance itself.""
While the art of deejaying is sometimes not viewed as a very
prestigious activity or profession to be associated with the specific
musical skills or techniques that traditional musicians must acquire,
"this perspective changes once one considers the twin turntable set
and the audio mixer as one instrument consisting of three units that
have to be operated simultaneously as well as synchronously in order
to allow the artistry of deejaying to emerge." 1 8
addicts as we listen again and again... [i]t's for this reason that music can be
transcendent. For a few moments it makes us larger than we really are, and the
world more orderly than it really is .... As our brains are thrown into overdrive,
we feel our very existence expand and realize that we can be more than we
normally are, and that the world is more than it seems. That is cause enough for
ecstasy.
109. See FIKENTSCHER, supra note 70, at 41.
110. See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 302.
111. "While mixing skills have helped many a DJ achieve cult status, especially in the
field of hip-hop music, they are not considered as important as programming skills in the
context of ... club music." Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 299.
112 See id. at 290.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See SALZMAN, supra note 70, at 171.
117. Id. "Modem jazz and its offshoots is a complex performance art with a wide
harmonic and melodic range and special emphasis on instrumental virtuosity. Its
impromptu, intuitive and even ecstatic qualities have been enormously influential on
almost every kind of new music." Id at 232-33.
11& Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 298-99.
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1) DJ Techniques
DJs employ three main technical skills in creating their unique
brand of electronic music. First, the technique of 'slip-cueing' allows a
DJ to construct an "uninterrupted musical program through the
blending together of individual records to form one seemingly
unending musical soundscape.""' 9 This is the most common way for a
DJ to segue from one record to another. 12° A second common
technique is the 'fast cut,' 12' which involves a rapid, almost
instantaneous switch between turntables, usually just before the first
downbeat of the section or song about to be played.l 2 The third main
technique that DJs use is the overlay,' 3 achieved by playing two
records at the same time through the P.A. system for an extended
period of time, often lasting minutes. The aim is to "synchronize two
different records so as to make them sound like one piece of music
(which they then become in the hands of an accomplished DJ)."' 24
When a DJ "works a record,"'2' the DJ becomes a performer.' 26
C. The Dance: The Audience's Response to the
DJ's Performance

Electronic music evolved from house music, which evolved from
disco. 27 One author has said that the main way that electronic dance
music differs from traditional music is that electronic dance music is
not just about creating new sounds, but is also about learning to listen
to music in a different way.'2 With conventional music, the audience
tends to listen to the structure of the song and follow the songwriter's
lyrics. By contrast, with electronic dance music, the music is more
cyclical and continuous and often has few or no lyrics for the listener

119.
120.

See id. at 296-97.
See id. at 299.

121. Id.
122. I1
123. Id.
124. See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 299.
125. Id.
126. Consider this account of New York DJ David Morales' technique:
"Morales doesn't play records so much as he transforms them. Many of the 12inch singles Morales mixes are grating and monotonous when left unaltered or
heard out of their club context. But layered on top of another, cut up, stretched
out, and paced to create an evening of multiple climaxes, these bass-and-drum
machine-generated records turn into grand, almost symphonic soundscapes of
urban life." See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 302.
127. See FRITZ, supra note 2, at 65.
128. Id. at 76.
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to focus on.' 29 Thus, it has been said that the experience of listening to
electronic dance music is much like the experience the musician has
when he creates the music, in that it requires concentration and focus.
Electronic dance music is specifically designed to inspire the intense
physical desire to dance."O
"The shared cultural dimension that enables DJs and dancers to
interact.., is marked by... tension between freedom and order." ''
This tension has been compared to the development of free-form
jazz,"" as "the interdependence of a rhythm section and a soloist in a
jazz ensemble is comparable to that of DJ and dancers. The rhythm
section shares with the DJ a focus on pulse and structure (harmonic
and/or rhythmic), providing a foundation on which the soloist can
'dance."'1 33 The members of the audience at an electronic music
concert or at a rave are like the jazz soloists, as they are expected to
"make their own choices in terms of... execution, in relation to the
performance.., of... the ensemble."'' 4
"Dancing, the response to successful deejaying, involves the
'listener' actively. Dancing transforms a 'listener' into a 'dancer,'
whose performance has the often realized potential of influencing the
[DJ's] programming, thereby creating a feedback loop between DJ
booth and dance floor."' 35 A successful response from the dance floor
is the Dl's responsibility.
I1. The Crackhouse Statute Was Constitutional
As stated in the Introduction, the RAVE Act is an amendment
to the 1986 Crackhouse statute. While the Crackhouse statute has
been construed very narrowly by the courts and has been upheld as
constitutional, the RAVE Act faces formidable constitutional
hurdles. This section examines how the Crackhouse statute was able
to withstand challenges to its constitutional validity and how the
statutory language lent itself to a narrowing construction by the
courts.
Section (a)(1) of the Crackhouse statute made it illegal to
"knowingly open or maintain any place, for the purpose of

129.
130.
131.
132
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
See FIKENTSCHER,

supra note 70, at 91.

Id.
Id.
Id.

135. See Fikentscher, supra note 67, at 294.
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manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance ' 6 and
has withstood at least two challenges for vagueness.""
First, the Eleventh Circuit upheld this provision in 1992, holding
that a conviction under this section of the Crackhouse statute
required two mental elements: knowledge and purpose. As applied to
defendants whose acts were "so clearly within" the concept of
knowingly maintaining a place, the statute met constitutional
scrutiny. 138 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the inclusion of the two
intent elements within the statutory language itself, "knowingly" and
"for the purpose of," did much to eliminate contentions of vagueness
or unfairness of the statute as applied to criminal defendants.
The District of Columbia Circuit also rejected a vagueness
challenge that same year, holding that the statutory language was not
inherently ambiguous and could not reasonably be construed to
criminalize simple consumption of drugs in one's home. 39 Rather, the
court found that the "for the purpose of" language of 21 U.S.C. §
856(a)(1) precluded the conviction of the "casual" drug user under
the Crackhouse statute. 4°
Section (a)(2) of the Crackhouse statute criminalizes the
management or control of "any building, room, or enclosure, either as
an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, or make available for use, with or without
compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled
substance., 141 It survived a vagueness challenge on at least one
occasion.1 42 The Southern District of New York found this provision
of the Crackhouse statute to be constitutional, and that the statutory
terms "using" and "storing" did not cause the Crackhouse statute to
be impermissibly vague on its face.143 The court found the Crackhouse
statute similar to penal statutes such as those criminalizing the
136. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2005).
137. See U.S. v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
13A Clavis, 956 F.2d at 1094. These acts included leasing the premises, being regularly
present on the premises when the landlord comes to conduct repairs, paying rent for the
premises and accepting the keys of the premises from the landlord.
139. Lancaster,968 F.2d at 1253.
140. Id.
141. See U.S. v. Milani, 739 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
142. Id.
143. Milani, 739 F. Supp. at 216, in which the court was "unable to rule on whether the
statute is impermissibly vague as applied to the defendant" in this case, in the absence of a
plenary trial record. Id.
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conduct of landlords of houses of prostitution, statutes whose facial
validity had long been assumed. 1"4
The Crackhouse statute was never challenged as overbroad, and
the Supreme Court has never considered the constitutionality of the
Crackhouse statute on any basis.1 45
A. Elements of a "Crackhouse" Offense
The mens rea component to a "Crackhouse" offense,
incorporated by the various courts of appeal, virtually eliminated
constitutional concerns of overbreadth. Section (a)(1) applied to the
property manager or owner using the premises for unlawful purposes
himself. Section (a)(2) applied to the property manager who allowed
others to use the premises for unlawful purposes. The elements of a
Crackhouse offense were established through evidence linking the
defendant to the premises, either in a supervisory or managerial role
under Section (a)(1) or as a landlord under Section (a)(2).'"
1. Section (a)(1)
To convict a defendant under the old Crackhouse statute,
Section (a)(1), the jury had to find that the defendant a) knowingly b)
opened or maintained a place c) for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance."'
a) Knowingly
The knowledge of a defendant could be imputed to him when a
reasonable jury could infer that the defendant would have come
across and therefore known about drugs and drug paraphernalia
scattered throughout the house.' 8 Likewise, if the defendant did not
have reason to know of any drugs or drug paraphernalia in the house,
he would not be convicted under Section (a)(1).149 The knowledge

144. See, e.g., N.Y Laws 230.40 (2004): "A person is guilty of permitting prostitution
when, having possession or control of a premises which he knows are being used for
prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use." Id.
145. The constitutionality of the Crackhouse statute has also been challenged on
numerous occasions on double jeopardy grounds, but such challenges are beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally Richard Belfiore, Validity, Construction and
Application of Federal "Crack-House Statute" Criminalizing Maintaining Place for
Purpose of Making, Distributing,or Using Controlled Drugs (21 U.S.C.A. § 856) 116

A.L.R. FED. 345 (1993).
146. U.S. v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463,466-67 (7th Cir. 1993).

147. See U.S. v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1989).
148. See id.
149. Id. at 1429-30.
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element would be easier to prove if the defendant actually lived on
the premises.
b) Opened or Maintained a Place
This was typically the easiest element for prosecutors to
establish, and the defendant was usually charged with maintaining,
rather than opening, the place. A court would find that a defendant
maintained a property if the defendant exercised sufficient "dominion
and control" over it; the dominion and control under this statute was
more stringent than that of drug possession statutes. In this context,
"maintain" connoted a higher degree of continuity and duration than
mere constructive possession.)o The easiest way to charge the
by proving that he had
defendant with maintaining the premises was
151
property.
the
for,
rent
paid
or
to,
title
legal
c) For the Purpose of
The relevant "purpose" under Section (a)(1) was that of the
defendant himself, and no others.152 The defendant had to maintain
the place for his own goal of manufacturing, distributing or using
drugs.153 It was not sufficient that he allowed others to use the
property for such purposes.' 4 The Seventh Circuit has suggested that
a finding that the defendant held a "supervisory, managerial or
entrepreneurial" role in a drug enterprise was one way to ascertain
whether the defendant had the requisite mental purpose for a
conviction under Section (a)(1).15
2. Section (a)(2)
To convict a defendant under the old Crackhouse statute,
Section (a)(2), the jury had to find that the defendant a) managed or
150. U.S. v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1997).
151. U.S. v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1990). Juries have been allowed to
infer that a criminal defendant maintained a place with much less evidence-for example,
when the defendant had hung clothes or had traffic tickets in the closets of rooms where
drugs and drug paraphernalia were found. Id.
152. U.S. v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 190.
154. Id. Note that the majority of cases tried under the Crackhouse statute were

prosecuted under Section (a)(1). See supra notes 148-154 and accompanying text.
155. U.S. v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit has cited
items that may be used as evidence that a defendant is using a place to run a drug business.
The list includes: lab equipment, scales, guns and ammunition to protect the inventory and
the profits; packaging materials such as baggies, vials, gelcaps, etc; financial records or
profits (in the form of cash or expensive merchandise; and the presence of multiple
employees or customers; see U.S. v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 297 (10th Cir. 1995).
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controlled a building, room or enclosure b) either as owner, lessee,
agent, employee or mortgagee and c) knowingly made it available for
the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, or using a
controlled substance."-6
a) Managed or Controlled
Under this section, the defendant must have managed or
controlled the building, room or enclosure where drug use took place,
which normally
meant the defendant owned or had legal title to the
15
property. 1
b) Owner, Lessee, Agent, Employee or Mortgagee
The plain language suggested that the defendant under this
section could hold any number of titles vis-h-vis the property and be
liable under Section (a)(2).
c) Knowingly Made it Available for the Purpose of
1)Knowingly Made it Available
Section (a)(2) required only that proscribed activity was present
on the property, that the defendant knew of the activity and allowed
the activity to continue.) 8 The Tenth Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit both recognized, in analyzing the former Section
(a)(2), that knowledge of what goes on inside a house may be inferred
from living therein. 159 The Jenkins court noted that the natural
inference, with a house, is that those who live in the house know what
is going on inside it, particularly in the common areas.1 ° Thus, the
defendant who maintained a house where the primary purpose of the
building was as a residence, or a commercial property as a business
enterprise, could nevertheless be convicted under Section (a)(2) if the
defendant knowingly made the premises available to other residents
or businesspeople for the secondary purpose of drug manufacture,
distribution or use. 6 1

156. Chen, 913 F.2d at 187 (quoting U.S. v. Onick, 889 F.2d at 1431 n.1 (5th Cir.

1989)).
157. U.S. v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Harrison, 133 F.3d
1084, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1998).
158. U.S. v. Tamez, 941 F.2d at 770,774 (9th Cir. 1991).
159. See U.S. v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175,
1179 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
160. Jenkins, 928 F.2d at 1175-79.
161. Id. at 1179; Tamez, 941 F.2d at 774.
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2)For the Purpose of
Unlike the "purpose" element of Section (a)(1), which went to
the purpose of the defendant property-owner,' 62 the purpose at issue
under Section (a)(2) is not that of the person managing or controlling
the building, 1%ut rather it is the purpose of the people renting or
otherwise using the place for illegal activities.
Because it is harder to prove that a person knowingly made his
property available to others for illegal uses than it is to prove that a
person knowingly used his own property for illegal drug activities, the
majority of cases that were tried under the Crackhouse statute
resulted in convictions under Section (a)(1). The former Section
(a)(2) was unusual in that the purpose element applied to someone
other than the actor.' 6 Notably, the majority of Crackhouse cases
involved actual crackhouses, where the properties had little or no
legitimate value or use unrelated to drug activity. Thus, historically,
legitimate businesses or residential homes were safe from prosecution
under the Crackhouse statute. The strict judicial construction of the
Crackhouse statute kept it within constitutional bounds and
prevented it from being struck down as vague or overbroad.
The rationale behind the Crackhouse statute was that it deterred
property owners from maintaining, or making their premises
available as, a disorderly house. The term "disorderly house" usually
refers to houses of prostitution or ill fame, common gaming houses,
or controlled substance premises (crackhouses).' 6' A disorderly house
is also defined as "a dwelling where people conduct criminal or
immoral activities." 1 66
IV. Early Attempts to Use the Crackhouse
Statute to Shut Down Raves
The federal government originally tried to prosecute promoters
of electronic music concerts under the Crackhouse statute and other
federal drug laws. The four major targets were Little Rock, Arkansas;
Boise, Idaho; Panama City, Florida; and New Orleans, Louisiana, and

162. Tamez, 941 F.2d at 774.
163. Chen, 913 F.2d at 191.
164. The Chen court found at least 16 federal criminal statutes that use the
combination of "knowingly" and "for the purpose of." In all of these, the purpose
requirement clearly goes to the "actor" in the statute, the one who has the knowledge. Id.
at 190 n.9.
165. 24 AM JUR 2D Disorderly Houses § 23 (2004).
166. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 210 (2d ed. 2001).
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their prosecutions were characterized by Senator Biden as "two wins,
a loss and a draw." 167
One of the two "wins" was in Boise, Idaho, where federal
prosecutors have invoked the Crackhouse statute in the rave context
several times since 2001.16 One electronic music promoter was
charged with using his business to sell drugs at raves and sharing in
drug profits.' 69 Another electronic music promoter convicted and
sentenced under the Crackhouse statute was selling ecstasy at his own
raves. 170 Thus, the Crackhouse statute can be and is used against
unscrupulous drug distributors who also maintain the place where the
drug distribution occurs. The Boise case illustrates how the nightclub
owner who acts like a crackhouse owner could have been effectively
prosecuted under the old Crackhouse statute, and that the RAVE
Act is unnecessary if the government's objective 17 is to prosecute
unscrupulous business owners. Now the Boise rave scene, if it still
exists, has gone underground, according to Boise Mayor Brent
Coles. in

The other "win" was the Little Rock case,73 which involved
federal drug conspiracy charges against electronic music promoters
who had people sell ecstasy for them at electronic music concerts.
These defendants were actually convicted under conspiracy laws. The
Crackhouse statute was not used in this case at all. 74 The Little Rock
case demonstrates that drug conspirators can, and should be,
punished under existing federal drug laws.
The "loss" took place in Panama City, Florida, where police
seized Blow PopsTM and bubblegum from the club's gift shop as
167. 148 CONG. REc. S5706 (daily ed. June 18,2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).
168. See Patrick Orr, Boise Man Faces Drug Charges: Rave Promoter Had Plans to
Run a Boise Academy, IDAHO STATESMAN, July 23, 2002, at 1.
169. See Patrick Orr, Rave Promoter Gets Prison Term for Drug, Conspiracy
Convictions, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 2,2003, at Local 3.
170. See Patrick Orr, Boise Man Sentenced for Selling Ecstasy, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Oct. 3, 2002, at Local 3; Rave PromoterWill Go To Prison,IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 20,
2002, at Local 1.
171. In fact, the government's objective, as stated by the main sponsor of the RAVE
Act, Senator Biden, is to prosecute "rogue" rave promoters. See infra note 258.
172 See Donna Leinwand, Cities Crack Down on Raves: Rising Popularity Prompts
Backlash Over Drug Use, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2002, at Al. That raves are now being
driven underground leads to a policy argument against the RAVE Act. See infra Part
VII.B.
173. 148 CONG. REc. S5706 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden). Only
the cases in Boise, Panama City, and New Orleans involved charges under the Crackhouse
statute, which would hold the owners of the property criminally and civilly liable.
174. See id.
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evidence that the managers knew of, and consented to, drug use.' 75
The prosecution pointed to items such as glow sticks, bubblegum and

water to prove that the CEO and the club's general manager knew
there was drug use within the club and allowed it to continue. 76
Prosecutors argued that these items were proof of drug use because
ecstasy causes a range of physical reactions when ingested, including
heightened sensitivity, more energy, uncontrollable clenching of jaw
muscles and grinding of teeth, and elevated body temperatures. What

the prosecution failed to do, however, was demonstrate that the mere
presence of these items on the premises was sufficient to establish
that the defendants had imputed knowledge of illegal activities

occurring on the premises. ' 7 The case went to trial but on November
27, 2001 a jury acquitted the defendants
of all charges after only
1 8
deliberation.
of
minutes
seventy-five
The "draw" was the government's first effort to prosecute a
nightclub owner under the Crackhouse statute, the first prosecution
of its kind in the country. 79 The federal government's first anti-rave
initiative prosecuted under the Crackhouse statute was launched in
New Orleans with its case against the State Palace Theater, in which a
United States Attorney brought charges against Robert Brunet and
Brian Brunet, the owners of Barbecue of New Orleans (doing
business as the State Palace Theater "State Palace") and James

Estopinal, the event promoter at the State Palace."8 The government
offered all the defendants a plea deal that included a ban of particular
items' from the State Palace, despite the defendants' actions to

175. David Angier, Prosecutors Try to Establish Conspiracy Case Against La Vela
Officials, PANAMA
CITY NEWS HERALD,
Nov. 9, 2001, available at
http://www.newsherald.com/articles/2001/11/09/loll0901b.htm (last visited June 5,2004).
176. Id. At trial, a county sheriff's investigator said ecstasy users wave glow sticks in
front of their eyes for visual stimulation, and chew blow pops and bubblegum to minimize
the damage to their teeth. The investigator admitted on cross-examination that simply
because someone uses a glow stick doesn't mean they're using controlled substances.
177. For a fascinating discussion of items found at raves such as candy, glow sticks and
baby pacifiers and their significance, see Michael H. Dore, Targeting Ecstasy Use At Raves,
88 VA. L. REv. 1583, 1605-18 (2002).
178. See David Angier, La Vela Officials Acquitted, PANAMA CITY NEWS HERALD,
Nov. 28,2001, at 1A.
179. S. 2633, 107th Cong. (2002).
180. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, McClure v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2532 at 2 (E.D. La. Feb. 01, 2002) (No. 01-2573), vacated on other grounds
McClure, 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memorandum].
181. The list of items included pacifiers, objects that glow, masks, vapor rub products
and massage tables. See id.
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prevent drug use on the property1 82 and the lack of any evidence that
they were involved with drug activity in any way. They accepted the
plea deal to avoid the possibility of serving time in jail, but later
challenged it on constitutional grounds. 183
184
Public reaction against the government's prosecution mounted
and the judge ruled that the defendants' plea agreement should be
enjoined, noting that while there was a substantial government
interest in eliminating ecstasy use at the State Palace Theater during
raves, the government has "burdened substantially more speech than
is necessary in order to achieve their stated purpose ... by completely
banning the named expressive objects." 18'
No doubt, the government's mixed results in using the
Crackhouse statute to try to prosecute electronic music promoters
and business owners who provide a forum for this type of music were,
at least in part, the impetus behind Senator Biden's "tailoring" the
Crackhouse statute to the rave situation. No doubt, the new RAVE
Act makes a prosecutor's job easier. 86 However, in the "tailoring,"
Congress actually expanded the language of the Crackhouse statute
in a way that renders it substantially and unconstitutionally overbroad
and therefore violative of the First Amendment rights of several
groups of people.
V. The History of the RAVE Act
The RAVE Act was first introduced in the Senate on June 18,
8
2002,'
7 and the House of Representatives held hearings on the bill

182 Id.
183. Id. They claimed that the government's civil injunction banning pacifiers, objects
that glow, masks, vapor rub products, massage tables and chill rooms from the State
Palace were objects that were not inherently illegal and could not be banned from their
premises.
184. Id. According to Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 10
32, a New Orleans Times
Picayune editorial condemned the misuse of the Crackhouse law; the conservative Weekly
Standard called for the dismissal of U.S. Attorney Eddie Jordan, and the case was
scrutinized in publications such as Time Magazine, the Los Angeles Times and the New
York Times.
185. See McClure v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 188410 at *5 (E.D. La.) (2002), rev'd on other
grounds, McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
186. See generally Gwen Filosa, Rave Promoters Face Narcotics Charges; Indictments
based on 'Crackhouse Law,' TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 13, 2001, at 1, referring to U.S.
Attorney Jordan's prediction that other cities would follow New Orleans' example in using
the Crack House Statute in the rave context. Because of proof problems, Jordan's
prediction was not fulfilled. Id.
187. S.2633, 107th Cong. §§ 1-4 (2002).
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that October.' 88 In the Senate, two of the original co-sponsors of the
bill, Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chair of the

Senate Judiciary Committee, took the rare step of withdrawing
themselves as co-sponsors, citing concerns that the bill lacked
adequate protection for innocent property owners. 89 Senator Leahy
noted that the House Judiciary Committee heard evidence the
previous year that the Drug Enforcement Administration and

prosecutors had begun using the Crackhouse statute to pursue "even
business owners who take serious precautions" to avoid drug use at
their events.1' ° He was also concerned with the provision allowing civil

suits that "dramatically increase[d]"'91 the potential liability of
business owners, and urged further consideration of this provision,
included in what he termed a "hastily-assembled package." '12 Senator
Durbin withdrew his support from the bill in September.193

Ultimately, Senate leadership never brought it up for a full
Senate vote.1 4 The House Subcommittee on Crime held a hearing on
the bill but decided not to vote on it. 95 Finally, both the House and

Senate versions of the RAVE Act died when the 107th Congress
adjourned at the end of 2002. In February of 2003, Senate supporters
re-introduced the RAVE Act under a new name (the Illicit Drug
Anti-Proliferation Act).19 The new bill did not contain the
188. Reducing Americans' Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 5519
Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002). It passed the Senate Judiciary Committee a
little over a week after it was introduced, without a public hearing or recorded vote, and
was expected to quickly pass the full Senate. See http://emdef.orgs2633 (last visited June
5, 2004). While public hearings are not required, they are usually the starting point of a
committee's
consideration
of
a
bill.
See
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/howourlawsaremade.pdf (last visited Nov.
27, 2005).
189. See bill summary and status, S. 2633, 107th Cong. (2002), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 11, 2004). Durbin withdrew on Sept. 24, 2002;
Leahy on Sept. 13, 2002. Id.
190. Press Release, Senator Leahy's office (April 10, 2003), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200304/041003c.html (last visited June 8, 2004); see also Aja
Whitaker, Business Owners Ranting Over Rave Law: Drug Law Targets Club Managers,
Owners,
TAMPA
BAY
Bus.
J.,
July
21,
2003,
available
at
http://tampabay.bizjournals.com/tampabay/stoies/2003/07/21/story6.htm?page=l(last
visited June 5, 2004).
191. Press Release, Senator Leahy's office (April 10, 2003), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200304/041003c.html (last visited June 8, 2004).
192. Id.
193. See supra note 189.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, S. 226, 108th Cong. §§ 1-4 (2003).
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controversial "findings" section included in the 2002 bill that found

"raves have become little more than a way to exploit American

youth" and that the trafficking and use of "club drugs" is "deeply

embedded in the rave culture."' '
At the same time, a bill identical to the Illicit Drug AntiProliferation Act was introduced in the House under the old name:
the RAVE Act.1" As opposition to the legislation grew, supporters

chose to bypass the traditional process and attach it at the last minute
to an unrelated bill without debate or a vote of Congress.' 99 Senator
Biden slipped the RAVE Act into the "Amber Alert" bill." ° The final

"Amber" bill was then sent to every Member of Congress for a final
straight-up or straight-down vote. Even those that opposed the
RAVE Act had to vote for the final "Amber" bill if they wanted to

enact the provisions combating child abductions2 1 This is how the
RAVE Act, a controversial drug distribution bill, was passed into law
as part of an omnibus bill to protect children, at a time when child
safety was a politically hot topic and one that could not be delayed. 2
In contrast, the Crackhouse statute was passed as part of an
omnibus anti-drug bill:
a bill to strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign
cooperation in eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting
international drug traffic, to improve enforcement of Federal drug
197. See S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
19& See H.R. 718, 108th Cong. (2003).
199. See Neva Chonin, Congress Acts Out Against Club Culture, S.F. CHRON., April
27, 2003 (Sunday Datebook), at 35; Evelyn McDonnell, Antirave New World-A Bill in the
Senate Designed to go After Drug Use Has Fans of Electronic Music Singing an Angry
Tune, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2002, at El; David Montgomery, Ravers Against the
Machine: PartiersandACLU Take On 'Ecstasy' Legislation, WASH. POST, July 18, 2002, at
Al.
200. See S.151, 108th Cong., 149 CONG. REc. S5334 (daily ed. April 11, 2003).
201. Id.
202. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 608 (2003). The bill passed at a time
when everyone in the nation was concerned with the safety of children. Elizabeth Smart
had recently been found and returned to her Salt Lake City home, and two teenage girls
had just been rescued from their abductor in Southern California, thanks to that state's
emergency response system. Congress wanted to take immediate action regarding missing
children, and thus the PROTECT Act was signed into law by President George W. Bush
on April 30th, 2003. This act created the desired nationwide Amber Alert system and
simultaneously revived the RAVE Act. The America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency
Response ("AMBER") system was created as a legacy to 9-year-old Amber Hagerman,
who was kidnapped while riding her bicycle in Arlington, Texas, and then brutally
murdered. See http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/amberalert/ (last visited June 8, 2004) or
http://www.amberalertnow.org/ (last visited June 8, 2004).
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laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug shipments, to provide
strong Federal leadership in establishing effective drug abuse
prevention and education programs, to expand Federal support for
drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for other
purposes.

As the Chen court noted, this law "was enacted to outlaw
operation of houses or buildings, so-called 'crack houses', where
'crack', cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used." The
Crackhouse statute was a natural fit into a larger bill targeting drug
use and distribution on many different levels.

VI. The RAVE Act is Unconstitutional
The RAVE Act may be challenged on any number of
constitutional grounds, but this Article will examine the main
constitutional challenge to the RAVE Act: its overbreadth.m This
section examines how the substantial overbreadth of the statute chills
the exercise of constitutionally protected activities engaged in by
electronic musicians, their audience, electronic music promoters and
even political organizations.
A. The Overbreadth Doctrine
A statute is overbroad when it is designed to punish activities
that are not constitutionally protected but includes within its scope
activities that are protected by the First Amendment.'
The
objectionable qualities of overbreadth rest chiefly upon "the danger

203. See H.R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S13,779 (daily ed.
September 26, 1986).
204. See Chen, 913 F.2d at 188.
205. Recall that the Crackhouse statute, on which the RAVE Act was based, has been
challenged unsuccessfully as being overly vague but it has never been challenged as
overbroad. See generally Richard Belfiore, Validity, Construction and Application of
Federal "Crack-House Statute" Criminalizing Maintaining Placefor Purpose of Making,
Distributing,or Using ControlledDrugs (21 U.S.C.A. § 856), 116 A.L.R. FED. 345 (1993).
206. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
496 (1982); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 69 (1981); Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens For a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 627 (1980); Young v.
American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 59 n.17 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 155 (1969); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 216; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. Cr. REV. 1 (1981)
(arguing that overbreadth analysis involves substantive constitutional law); Martin H.
Redish, The Warren Court, The Burger Court and The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031 (1984) (discussing the overbreadth doctrine from an
anti-categorical perspective).
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of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence
of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
application." ' Justice Powell has said that the inherent danger with
an overbroad law is that it can become a "convenient tool" for harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials against
particular groups." Justice Marshall has said that the Court will
ultimately vindicate a person whose speech is constitutionally
protected, "for the value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not
that it drops. '' 9
1. Historical Origins
The fountainhead 210 of the overbreadth doctrine was Thornhill v.
Alabama2 ' decided by the Supreme Court in 1940. The plaintiff in
that case was an individual seeking reversal of his conviction for
loitering and picketing under an Alabama statute prohibiting a
person, without just cause or legal excuse, to "go near to or loiter
about the premises of"'212 any person engaged in lawful business for
the purpose of influencing or inducing others to adopt any of certain
enumerated courses of action. 3 The Court struck the Alabama
statute on its face, holding that the freedom of speech secured by the
First Amendment against abridgment by the government is among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all
214
persons.
The main rationale for this doctrine is that an overly broad
statute can have a chilling effect 211 on the First Amendment right to

207. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 465 (1987) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)): "As the
Court observed over a century ago, '[i]t would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to
step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large."'
20& See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
209. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. This term was used by Professor Monaghan in his early scholarship of this
doctrine. See Monaghan, supra note 206, at 11.
211. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
212 Id. at 92.
213. Id. Thornhill was a union activist who was protesting his employer's policy of not
employing union laborers.
214. Id. at 95.
215. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 256 n.2 (1967); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1971); see also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 844,853 (1970).
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free speech. This rationale serves two main functions.1 6 First, it is the

reason for striking an overbroad law and ending "its deterrence of
' second, it directly answers the
constitutionally preferred activities;"217

argument that courts should act with judicial restraint until "a
claimant who is himself privileged has pursued [all] normal channels
of review" first.218 The appreciation of the chill on potential litigants
and its steep potential costs 219-namely delay in as applied review and

the intervening loss of rights-has led the Supreme Courtm to
invalidate statutes on their face, rather than waiting for a litigant to
challenge the statute's constitutionality on the basis of how it has
been applied to him. In this sense, the overbreadth doctrine has been
called a prophylactic one, with its main purpose to combat this
chilling effect.nl

The overbreadth doctrine has been called a "principled response
to the systematic failure of other methods of adjudication to protect
first amendment rights adequately. ' 222 Since Thornhill, the First

Amendment overbreadth doctrine flourished for nearly thirty years
under the Warren Court, which tended to be protective of individual

liberties. 22 Under the Burger Court, the doctrine appeared to be
severely curtailed, 224 namely by the holding in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma2 that the overbreadth of a statute, particularly where
conduct (not mere speech) is involved must be "not only ...real, but

216. See The FirstAmendment OverbreadthDoctrine,supra note 215, at 853-56.
217. Id.
21& Id. at 853.
219. Id.
220. See Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,78 Nw. U. L.REv. 1031 (1984).
221. See Richard F. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth,100 YALE L.J. 853, 868

n.94 (1991). Professor Fallon, in using the term "prophylactic," refers to two things: 1) that
the central Constitutional concern is to protect the speech or expressive activity of persons
other than those who are allowed to present overbreadth challenges; and 2) that courts,
especially the Supreme Court, have discretion to adjust the doctrine's contours in light of
their assessment of the doctrine's practical effects. See also Daniel Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as
Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247, 293-95 (1988) (arguing that the

Constitution may require some rule or doctrine to protect Constitutional values, even
when it does not require any particular rule or doctrine); Henry Paul Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword-ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1975). The prophylactic effect of the overbreadth doctrine may be traced back to the
origins of judicial review found in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
222. The FirstAmendment OverbreadthDoctrine,supra note 215, at 846.
223. See supra note 220.
224. Id.

225. 413 U.S. 601(1973). Professor Redish has called this ruling the "watershed (or
perhaps) Waterloo of modem overbreadth analysis." See Redish, supra note 220, at 1057.

2006]

THE RAVE Acr

substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep."' The Burger Court, in what First Amendment
scholar Martin Redish has called an "overreaction" to the Warren

Court's approach to the overbreadth doctrine, placed limits on the
doctrine's use "that seem to have no rhyme or reason, other than that
they limit the protective reach of the overbreadth doctrine." The
result was a retrenchment from the Warren Court's protective
approach to individual liberties. After Broadrick, any case involving
expressive conduct had to be substantially overbroad. 2
The Broadrick decision ostensibly created a limitation on the
ability of individuals to bring First Amendment overbreadth claims

when the protected activity is expressive conduct, 2 9 rather than
"pure" (verbal) speech. Yet a glaring omission from the Broadrick
opinion was any reference to the traditionally cited "'speech plus'

chestnuts."

The Court's next overbreadth opinion was a pure

speech case that failed to mention Broadrick at all, 231 and in its

subsequent decisions the Court appeared to abandon the distinction
between expressive conduct and pure speech entirely. 232 In its next
overbreadth case, the Court held that the "substantiality"
requirement of Broadrick was "sound" 3 and should be applied to all

First Amendment claims of overbreadth, irrespective of whether the

226. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973).
227. See Redish, supra note 206, at 1032 n.7.
228. See id. at 1058.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 1059 n.152-54, citing "speech plus" opinions such as United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); and Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The term "speech plus" refers to speech that contains within it
strong elements of action. See, e.g., Broadrick,413 U.S. at 615; Redish, 78 Nw. U. L. REv.
1031, 1058; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 988-89 (2d ed. 1983).
231. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (city ordinance making it
unlawful to "curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with
reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty"
was overbroad because the term "opprobrious" could be applied to statements that were
not likely to give rise to an immediate breach of the peace).
232. Compare Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980) (declaring ordinance prohibiting door-to-door or on-street solicitation of
contributions by charitable organizations that do not use at least seventy-five percent of
their receipts for "charitable purposes" overbroad and the opinion makes no reference to
the "expressive conduct" limitation of Broadrick) (White, J.) with Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 618, 620-21 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (in which Justice White
first urges application of the "conduct limitation" to an ordinance involving essentially the
same type of solicitous conduct at issue in Schaumburg).
233. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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claim is one of expressive conduct or pure speech. 2 Thus, today any

claim that a statute is overbroad must meet the substantiality
requirement. The substantiality requirement has never been defined

by the Supreme Court and is an analytic nightmare.

35

Under the

analysis employed in both Broadrick and Ferber,the substantiality of

the overbreadth is determined on a comparative or relative basis, by
comparing the number of instances of unprotected activity reached by
the challenged statute to the number of instances of protected activity
reached. 2 6 If the ratio of unprotected activity to protected activity is

high, the statute can stand, 237 but if the statute reaches a relatively
high proportion of protected activities, the statute is struck.2
2. Modern Overbreadth 239
While the substantiality requirement

appears

to be good

common sense, more recent decisions from the Supreme Court
illustrate the problems inherent to the theory that substantiality may
be gauged by using a simple tally. Massachusetts v. Oakesm is
illustrative.241 While Justices Brennan and Scalia agreed that a statute

prohibiting the production or distribution of photos of children in
particular forms of partial nudity was overbroad, the issue of
substantiality remained. 242 For both Justices, the issue was largely one
of how many family photos existed, for example, of naked toddlers on

234. Id.; see also Redish, supra note 206, at 1064.
235. Professor Redish argues that "by applying its code word-'substantiality'instead of engaging in a careful interest-balancing process, the Court disregards
completely the essential function performed by the overbreadth doctrine in the first place:
to determine whether a valid statutory goal can be achieved by means less invasive of free
speech interests." See Redish, supranote 206, at 1066.
236. Broadrick states that "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is
involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 615 (emphasis added).
237. See Fallon, supra note 221, at 894 (pointing out the flaws in the Supreme Court's
logic in using such a formulaic approach to overbreadth).
23& Id.
239. Modem overbreadth doctrine is also an analytic nightmare. See Marc Rohr,
Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 413, 435 (1993):
"The entire Court... has been inconsistent in its application of announced limitations."
See, e.g., supra note 232 (Justice White appears inconsistent because he endorsed
application of Broadrick's expressive conduct limitation to a statute addressing solicitous
conduct in 1971; by 1980, in an opinion he authored discussing essentially the same issue,
Justice White apparently abandoned this position).
240. 491 U.S. 576 (1989) (plurality opinion).
241. See Fallon, supranote 221.
242- Id.
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the beach. 24
' 3 Justice Brennan concluded that there would be many
such photos relative to the statute's permissible applications.2 Justice
Scalia reached the opposite conclusion. 245 Neither Justice was able

to provide any numerical estimate, let alone a reliable numerical
estimate, as to how many acts by how many people in any given year
the statute might permissibly and impermissibly reach.
This unavoidable problem has led several First Amendment
scholars 27 to advocate abandonment of the simple tally approach to
gauging substantiality in favor of a more sensible balancing test.
Professor Fallon, for example, believes the Court should weigh: a) the
state's substantive interest in being able to impose sanctions for a
particular kind of conduct under a particular legal standard, as
opposed to being forced to rely on other, less restrictive substitutes
against b) the First Amendment interest in encouraging narrow
statutes and avoiding as much as possible the chilling of
constitutionally protected conduct. 248
The Court has suggested that "overbreadth" and "narrow
tailoring" are different expressions for the same constitutional
defect. 249 The narrowly tailored analysis is, by its nature, a balancing
243. Id
244. Oakes, 491 U.S. at 596.
245. Id at 590.
246. See Fallon, supra note 221, at 894. Ultimately, the overbreadth challenge to the
statute in question was rendered moot when the Massachusetts legislature amended the
statute.
247. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 221, at 894; Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the
Burger Court and the FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031
(1984); Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 541, 553-54 (1985).
248. See Fallon, supra note 221. Professor Fallon calls this a version of the familiar
First Amendment less-restrictive-alternatives analysis. For a similar formula, see
Alexander, supra note 247, at 553-54; see also Note, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969) (this analysis is likely to be used "wherever the
Supreme Court is serious about judicial review"); Redish, supra note 206, at 1066-69
(advocating a balancing test).
249. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (using the
requirements of the two terms interchangeably); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 114-20 (1972) (conflating overbreadth and narrow tailoring analyses). But see N.Y. v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (when the Court uses a categorical approach to free speech, as
opposed to the balancing approach, the overbreadth and narrow tailoring tests identify
different constitutional defects); see also Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947, 959, 965 n.13 (1984) (treating substantial overbreadth and narrow tailoring
requirements interchangeably, and noting that the term "overbreadth" has been used "to
describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts protected First
Amendment activity and does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest."); see also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. U.S., 990 F.2d 1271,
1274 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that there does not seem to be an apparent difference
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test.m While the Supreme Court never explicitly abandoned the old
substantiality formula, it has implicitly used a balancing test in recent
cases251 such as City of Houston v. Hill,2 Osborne v. Ohioz 53 and City
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.2 These cases indicate

that the Supreme Court cannot avoid ad hoc balancing when it seeks
to judicially review statutes that affect First Amendment rights.
B. The Overbreadth Analysis

This Article seeks to make a contribution to the growing body of
scholarship suggesting the doctrine of overbreadth can play a limited

role in checking the legislature when it deliberately drafts an
overbroad statute to obscure an improper purpose;25 and, in this case,
when the legislature deliberately drafts a very broad statute while

failing to give adequate consideration to the statute's impact on First
Amendment

rights.

As

the

modern

overbreadth

cases

and

commentary support an approach to overbreadth analysis that
focuses on whether the statute has been narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest, so will this Article, giving only
between the two tests); Marc I. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:Facial Challenges and
the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV 359 n.259 (1998); Monaghan, supra note
206, at 37 ("the Court has reacted interchangeably to 'overbreadth' and 'least restrictive
alternative' challenges both inside and outside the First Amendment context.")
250. See U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also THOMAS
E. BAKER & JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A NUTSHELL 138-43
(Thomson West Pub. Co. 2d ed. 2003) (1976) (a concise yet comprehensive description of
the different balancing tests the Supreme Court uses, and how and when these tests are
applied).
251. Even as far back as Ferber,Justice Stevens stated that he would "refuse to apply
overbreadth analysis for reasons unrelated to any prediction concerning the relative
number of protected communications that the statute may prohibit," leading one
commentator to speculate that Justice Stevens was in fact refusing to join his colleagues in
estimating the "substantiality" of the perceived overbreadth of any statute. See Marc
Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 413, 422
(1993).
252. 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (where the analysis plainly had a qualitative as well as a
quantitative dimension).
253. 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (while the Court avoided classifying its analysis as balancing,
it could not avoid a somewhat open-ended balancing approach).
254. 486 U.S. 750, 757-69 (1988) (standardless licensing statutes pose special threats to
First Amendment values, as they tend to mask invidious discrimination, thus insulating the
statute from judicial review).
255. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, FirstAmendment Overbreadth,
and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.1R-C.L. L. REV. 31, 36 n.30; Kenneth L.
Karst, Equalityas a CentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 38-39
(1975); Redish, supra note 206, at 138 n.150. This argument is implied in David S. Bogen,
FirstAmendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679, 713 (1978), and Note, The First
Amendment OverbreadthDoctrine,83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 918-20 (1970).
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263

limited consideration to the "substantiality" of the overbreadth of the
RAVE Act.
1. Narrowly Tailored2
In his introductory statements to S. 2633, Senator Biden
explained the new RAVE Act was intended to "tailor" the
Crackhouse statute to rave promoters' actions. 57 Later, after
opposition to the RAVE Act grew, he again stated
The purpose of my legislation is not to prosecute legitimate lawabiding managers of stadiums, arenas, performing arts centers,
licensed beverage facilities and other venues because of incidental
drug use at their events .... My bill would help in the prosecution
of rogue promoters who not only know that there is drug use at
their event but also25 8hold the event for the purpose of illegal drug
use or distribution.
As part of an overbreadth analysis, the Court does not just assess
the nature of the government's interest but also whether that interest
could be served by means that would be less intrusive of activities
protected by the First Amendment.259 In the electronic music context,
the government already has many tools with which it can target the
drug ecstasy-tools that do not violate an individual's constitutional
rights. For example, the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, the
Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 199626' and the
Chemical Diversion Trafficking Act 262 may all be used to curtail the
distribution of ecstasy or the possession or distribution of the
precursor chemicals needed to make the street drug ecstasy. The
Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000263 provides funds for school-

256. While some might say that the level of review should be intermediate under
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), this Note assumes that the conduct at raves
is expressive and is therefore entitled to the strict scrutiny of expressive conduct found in
cases such as Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See supra Part 1I, Sections B and C for
an illustration of why this conduct is expressive.
257. 148 CONG. REc. S5706 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden). It is
unclear from the record whether he was referring to parties held in nightclubs or parties
held in open spaces; presumably, he intended to target both.
258. 148 CONG. REC. S10,218 (daily ed. Oct. 9,2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).
259. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 642 (1999);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981); Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for A Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620,636 (1980).
260. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2004).
261. 21 U.S.C. § 872a (2004).
262. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2004).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-5b (2004).
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and community-based anti-drug abuse education programs. The

government's compelling interest is satisfied with these more
narrowly tailored statutes that do not burden First Amendment
rights.
The main reason the RAVE Act is overbroad is that while it
probably could aid law enforcement in prosecuting rogue rave
promoters, the statute sweeps too broadly into the domain of

precious First Amendment rights.
a) The RAVE Act's Effect on First Amendment Rights
The RAVE ACT is overbroad because it punishes activities that

are protected by the First Amendment. Among these activities is
music.2 The individual liberties that are most threatened by the
RAVE Act are those of three groups of people: 1) the DJs who create

their unique styles of electronic music live at their concerts; 2) their
audiences, electronic music enthusiasts who listen to the music and
who sometimes engage in their own expressive conduct: rave dancing;

and 3) the electronic music promoters who foster the development of
electronic music by promoting such concerts. Additionally, the broad
language of the RAVE Act enables law enforcement officials to

prosecute other protected activities like association for political
purposes that are outside the electronic music context.26
1)DJ Performer-Composers
As noted above in Part II B, the DJs at electronic music concerts

are performing live. This Article asserts that at these performances
they are creating music, a form of expression that is constitutionally

264. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a
form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment" ); Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("[L]ive entertainment, such as
musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee"); see also Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); California
v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Schacht v. U.S., 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The Seventh Circuit has held that wordless music is speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment. See Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d
943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983).
265. David Crisp, Free Drugs or Free Speech?, BILLINGS OUTPOST, June 12, 2003,
available at http://www.billingsnews.com/story?storyid=5213&issue=152 (The event at
issue in this case was a rock concert-benefit held by the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML") to raise money to put a medical marijuana
initiative on the ballot in 2004.).
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protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.26 Unlike arts

such as painting or literature, where there can only be one true
original that possesses authenticity,267 music is an art that depends on
performance for realization.26 As Justice Blackmun stated in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim,6 "[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his

liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it
'
may be exercised in some other place.2V
Therefore, it is not
constitutionally sufficient to say that people can create music in the
privacy of their own homes.
2)The Audience

The listeners at an electronic music concert can assert their own
independent claims to violations of their First Amendment rights. Put
another way, the audience to a communication may assert a First
Amendment right independent of the rights of the speaker 7' Where a
speaker exists, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source, and to its recipients. m If the RAVE Act eliminates all raves
and electronic music concerts nationwide and DJs cannot perform in

public, the audience loses its opportunity to listen, which is a violation
of the audience's First Amendment rights.23

The audience not only listens, but sometimes-as at other types
266. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,790 n.1 (1989) ("Music, as a
form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.").
267. Wes Blomster, Electronic Music, 32 TELOS 65, 66 (1977).
268. Id at 67.
269. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
270. Schad, 452 U.S. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 146, 151 (1939)).
271. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374,
2390-91, 2394 (1996) (statutory provision requiring cable system operators to segregate
and block "patently offensive" sex-related material on leased cable channels was
unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed too great a burden on the First
Amendment rights of the viewing audience); U.S. v. National Treasury Employees Union,
513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (prohibition on the receipt of honoraria by federal employees
imposed a "significant burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees
would otherwise have written and said"); see also Smith v. U.S., 431 U.S. 291, 319 n.18
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe First Amendment necessarily protects the right to
'receive information and ideas."' (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2581-82
(1972)); Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (the audience's rights to receiving a communication are reciprocal to those of
the speaker, or source, of the communication), noted in Joshua Waldman, Symbolic
Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1861 n.83 (1997).
272. See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (the protection afforded to communications runs both to
the source of the communication and to the recipient of the communication).
273. Id.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[28:229

of music concerts-members of the audience dance."' Just as the
Court has explicitly recognized that music is deserving of First
Amendment protection, 5 it has also explicitly afforded that same
protection to dance."6 While most of the Court's cases have
concerned nude dance and the expression conveyed therein, m this
Article argues that the dances performed at electronic music concerts
should be protected under the First Amendment, and to an even
greater extent than nude dance, as the dancing at electronic music
concerts do not run afoul of obscenity considerations. 278
Whether the dance performed by members of the audience at an
electronic music concert is protected by the First Amendment
depends on whether the conduct is expressive. 279 An individual's
conduct is considered expressive if it is "sufficiently imbued with the
elements of communication. '"m The Supreme Court developed a twopart test, the Spence test, to help courts determine whether expressive
conduct can be characterized as "speech": 1) whether an intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and 2) whether the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
281 Later, the Court's
who viewed it.
decision in Boy Scouts of America
v. Dalem eliminated the requirement that the message from an

274. See supra Part II.C; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
McClure v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 34673279 at 1 27 (E.D. La. Feb. 01, 2002) (No. 01-2573),
vacated on other grounds McClure, 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003). One dancer, Michael
Behan, uses both glow sticks and masks in his performances. Prior to the ban on glowing
objects and masks in the State Palace Theater case, he often came in character, dressed as
"Mr. Bunny," with his costume identifying him to other attendees as a "performance
dancer." See id
275. See supra note 267.
276. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991); Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 932 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1972); Schacht v. U.S., 398 U.S.
58 (1970).
277. See, e.g., FW/PBS, d/b/a Paris Adult Bookstore II v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215
(1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115 (1989); Young v. Arkansas, 474 U.S. 1070 (1985); New York State Liquor Auth.
v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 719 (1980). But see City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)
(social dancing is not constitutionally protected communicative activity).
278. Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of
Justice,
No.
2001-L0424-004,
April
2001,
at
4,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm. Most event attendees wear "lightweight,
loose-fitting clothes and dress in layers." Id
279. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Free speech is not limited to the spoken
word, nor does it apply to a limitless variety of conduct).
280. Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974) (per curiam).
281. Id
282. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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expressive associationm be particular. 284 Thus, today the standard for
whether conduct is expressive within the context of a parade 2 or
other expressive gathering is simply the determination that the intent
to convey a message was present and that the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.
In applying the Spence test to the dances performed at electronic
music concerts held at the State Palace Theater in New Orleans,
Judge Porteous in McClure v. Ashcroft2 found that the test was met,

that the dancers were acting as performance artists, that each
performance by each artist conveyed a different messagea7 and that
there was a great likelihood that the audience who viewed these
messages would understand the messages.2 Judge Porteous also

found that attendees of electronic music concerts do not attend just
for the music, but also to dance and to watch the performance of9
other dancers, whether they be on a stage or on the dance floor.2
Finally, the judge noted that just because the DEA agents who

investigated the electronic music concerts did not understand the
message that was conveyed did not mean that a message was not both
conveyed and understood.29 These performances are expressive

conduct protected by the First Amendment.
The main argument against including dancing to electronic music
within the category of expressive conduct protected by the First

283. This Article argues that the electronic music and dance community is an
expressive association. See infra text accompanying notes 319-20.
284.
[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the "purpose" of disseminating a
certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could
be impaired in order to be entitled to that protection. For example, the purpose
of the St. Patrick's Day parade in Hurley was not to espouse any views about
sexual orientation, but we held that the parade organizers had a right to exclude
certain participants nonetheless.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
285. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557
(1995), where the parade organizers were a private group named the South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council, an unincorporated association of individuals.
286. See McClure v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 188410 (E.D. La.) (2002), rev'd on other
grounds, McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
287. Usually the message was one of freedom or identity with a certain culture. See id.
288. Id. at 8 (quoting Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (1990)).
289. Id.
290. "[W]e think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled
distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to
the individual." Id (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,25 (1970)).
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292
Amendment 29' is that it is not expression at all, but mere conduct.
But the expression that is relevant to freedom of speech is "the
expression of a thought, sensation or emotion to another person."
(emphasis in original). 293 What dance expresses, as Judge Flaum
emphasized in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend,2 "is, like most artparticularly but not only nonverbal art-emotion, or more precisely
an ordering of sights and sounds that arouses emotion."
The
dancers at electronic music concerts are expressing their emotions.
Their dances, like the "unquestionably shielded painting[s] of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll, ' 2 are not expressing particular thoughts or ideas, but the
Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of art defy the
Spence test.297 The creative dances performed at electronic music
concerts and raves are simply another form of abstract art.

291. This special category includes "symbolic speech" actions such as picketing
(Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-04 (1940)); sleeping in a park (Clark v. Cmty for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), assuming but not deciding that sleeping
in a park is protected speech); wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War
(Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969)); flag burning to
protest governmental policies in general (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989));
nude dancing to convey eroticism (Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991)
and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)); see also John Hart Ely,
Flag Desecration" A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L REv. 1482 (1975); Martin Redish, The Content
Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L REv. 113 (1981); Richard A. Seid, A
Requiem for O'Brien: On the Nature of Symbolic Speech, 23 COLUM. L REv. 563 (1992);
Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning,97 COLUM. L. REv. 1844 (1997).
292. See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
293. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1092 (1990) (Posner, J.
concurring), rev'd by Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(applying O'Brien to a prohibition of nude dancing in nightclubs and declining to apply
the Spence test). The Barnes opinion has been criticized by several First Amendment
scholars. See, e.g., Professor Alan J. Howard, When Can the Moral Majority Rule?: The
Real Dilemma at the Core of the Nude Dancing Cases, 44 ST. Louis U. LJ. 897 (arguing
that all three rationales behind Barnes leave much to be desired); Professor Jed
Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L REv. 767, 773 (arguing that
Barnes should have been decided using an obscenity analysis); Professor Richard Seid, A
Requiem for O'Brien" On the Nature of Symbolic Speech, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 613
(arguing that content neutrality and the First Amendment cannot co-exist with respect to
the same regulation).
294. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1091.
295. Id
296. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
297. Id.
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3)Electronic Music Promoters
The activities of the electronic music concert promoters who
organize these creative events are also protected. The modern trend
of the Supreme Court is to implicitly treat the rights of expressive
associations as a unified doctrine.29 The Court now seems to consider
social clubs, parades, civil rights groups and political parties as all
being members of a larger category of expressive associations 9 In
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group,"° the

Court considered the attempt of a gay advocacy group to march in
Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade. One might think that a parade
would be considered the collective speech of the marchers. 3°' Instead,

the Court identified the "speaker" as the veterans' group 3°2 that
organized the parade. If the speaker is the organizer, the legitimate
electronic music promoter can be considered the First Amendment
speaker for this expressive association, the electronic music
community."
4)Association for Political Purposes
The RAVE Act also impairs the individual's right to assemble
peaceably. The freedom of association is derived from the freedom of

speech and assembly set forth in the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 3°4 Association for purposes expressly related to the First
Amendment includes political, religious or expressive activities," but
it is widely accepted that political speech is at the core of First

Amendment protection. 30' This most protected type of speech has
298. See Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Amendment Plural: Expressive
Associations and the FirstAmendment, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1483 (2001).
299. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000); Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
300. 515 U.S. at 557 (1995).
301. Id.
302. This private group, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, was an
unincorporated association of individuals. See id
303. The "rave culture" is one that is predominantly young and predominantly gay,
and one where the message conveyed by creative dance performances is one of peace,
love, unity and respect ("PLUR"). The PLUR philosophy is frequently seen on tickets,
bumper stickers, t-shirts and other items sold at "raves." See DRUG IDENTIFICATION
BIBLE 770, (Amera-Chem, Inc. 2001).
304. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
305. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.41 (3d ed. 1999).

306. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam) ("The First Amendment protects
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been inhibited by the RAVE Act.
The RAVE act is supposed to be used to punish business owners
and/or event promoters who "knowingly" allow drug-related
activities to take place at their events, but on its face the Act has
given free reign to law enforcement officials who are offended either
by opponents of the nation's current drug policy or by gay rights
groups, who frequently use electronic music concerts as fund-raising
events. As Justice Brennan stated in City of Houston, Texas v. Hill:
"Although we appreciate the difficulties of drafting precise laws, we
have repeatedly invalidated laws that provide the police with
unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for words or conduct that
annoy or offend them."" The RAVE Act is such a law.
Only two months after the RAVE Act was signed into law it was
used by the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") to
intimidate the owners of a Billings, Montana, Eagles lodge into
canceling a combined rock concert-benefit for the Montana chapter
of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) and Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP). 3°' On the
day the event was set to take place a Billings-based DEA agent
presented the venue owners with a copy of the RAVE Act, warning
them that they could face a fine of $250,000 if illicit drugs were found
on the premises. The bands, most of whom played regularly at the
venue, were also approached and warned that their participation in
the event could result in a fine. 310 After consulting with their lawyers,
the venue owners cancelled the event. 311 This incident demonstrates
the chilling effect of the RAVE Act.
It has been alleged that the DEA disagreed with the group's goal
of raising money to put a medical marijuana initiative on the ballot in
2004.312 The concert promoter/benefit organizer, a student at a local
university, later said that he would drop his activities in the NORML
chapter at Montana State University-Billings and in the SSDP group
as a result of this incident.3 13 This is yet another example of the
political association as well as political expression."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
307. See supra note 266.
308. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,465 (1987).
309. Id.
310. It
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See supra note 266. The promoter-organizer, Adam Jones, was jailed for a
probation violation the day before the concert. He had been on probation for a year and a
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RAVE Act's chilling effect.
The arbitrary enforcement of this law is a serious problem that

even the sponsor of the bill has recognized. Senator Biden expressed
his concerns to the DEA administrator regarding the DEA's actions
in Billings, and the agency has allegedly implemented internal
guidelines to make it harder for the law to be abused. The DEA
website, answering frequently asked questions about the new law,
says: "All DEA offices have been provided with guidance regarding
the implementation of this new statute. This guidance also establishes
procedures within DEA to obtain Headquarters review of proposed
enforcement activity under the Act. 3 14 These new enforcement
procedures are not available to the public.315
These guidelines do not have the force of law and therefore do

not provide any protection for political dissenters who might want to
hold a political rally but are concerned that the RAVE Act will be
used to shut down their event. In fact, when the RAVE Act was
passed, civil liberties groups, business associations and other groups
associated with the "rave community 3 16 held an electronic music

concert/political protest on the lawn of the United States Capitol
building317 on September 6, 2002.318 It is possible that somewhere
within that political protest someone was using illegal drugs. Under
the RAVE Act, as enacted, this type of political association could be
suppressed.1 9
half after being caught with one half of a gram of psilocybin mushrooms and was arrested
the day before the benefit concert for failing to report a change in supervisors at his job.
Id.
314. See Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't
of
Justice,
No.
2001-L0424-004,
April
2001,
at
4,
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
315. Id. An exhaustive search of the publications available on the Drug Enforcement
Administration website did not reveal the guidelines issued from headquarters to the field

offices.
316. See The RAVE Act of 2002, Electronic Music Defense & Education Fund,
availableat http://www.emdef.org/s2633 (last visited June 8,2004).
317. Note that the property owner who would be held liable in this hypothetical would
be the United States government. Presumably, the RAVE Act would never be used in

such a scenario.
318. See http://www.emdef.orgls2633/#protests (last visited June 8, 2004). The
Washington D.C., Capital Lawn protest was organized by Ravers Organized Against the
RAVE Act (ROAR) and was attended by "civil libertarians, health-care professionals,

business leaders, and electronic music fans [who] joined together to publicly express their
opposition to the RAVE Act." Compare this group with the parade organizers in Hurley,
who were also a private group (the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council) and an

unincorporated association of individuals.
319. The "rave community" is arguably something of a political community, as the
"protest party" is becoming increasingly prevalent. See FRITZ, supra note 2, at 221-22
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The RAVE Act on its face reaches not only raves but every kind
of expressive, political and cultural gathering imaginable, if any illegal
substance could be found there. Professor Monaghan argues that "the
Court has a unique responsibility to educate the other federal
branches in the need for sensitivity to free-speech interests. A holding
of invalidity for overbreadth would, in effect, 'remand' the problem to
the relevant branch for more finely tuned attention to speech
concerns. ....
",,30 Professor

Monaghan

also

believes

that

the

deterrence rationale underlying the overbreadth doctrine might also
dictate a special canon of federal statutory construction against
judicial narrowing.321 It is the legislature's duty to draft legislation
precisely, so that courts are not burdened with the task of ruling, on
each case to come before it, whether the statute is unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant in that particular case.322
2. The Compelling Government Interest
Judge

Porteous,

in

McClure v.

Ashcrof,3 3 framed

the

government's interest as "battling the use of the drug ecstasy. '' 32 This
is concededly a compelling interest that promotes the public's health
and safety. But while Congress intended the RAVE Act to serve that
government interest and the larger concern of ecstasy distribution, it
carelessly drafted the statute, thus rendering it overbroad. The statute
does not distinguish electronic music and the "rave culture ' , 321 from
the ecstasy use of some but certainly not all members of the
audience; 326 nor does it distinguish between legitimate, licensed
electronic music concerts and illegitimate raves.
The legislative history of the RAVE Act reveals that the
government's purpose is not really in reducing drug use and
distribution in constitutionally valid ways. Rather, the government's

(referring to protests named the International Street Party and Make Friends Not War (A
Rave for Peace)). See generally MICHEL GAILLOT, MULTIPLE MEANING, TECHNO: AN
ARTISTIC AND POLITICAL LABORATORY OF THE PRESENT (Editions Dis Voir 1998).
320. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth,1981 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 11 (1981).
321. Id
322. See Justice Powell's opinion in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975). When First Amendment rights are involved, "precision of drafting and clarity of
purpose are essential." Id at 217-18.
323. See McClure v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 188410 (E.D. La.) (2002), vacated on other
grounds by McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
324. Id.
325. See supra Part II.A.
326. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, McClure v. Ashcroft, 335
F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
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purpose is to eliminate all electronic music concerts as a way of
eliminating the drug ecstasy. This is not only unrealistic; it is
impermissible under the United States Constitution. An
impermissible legislative purpose can render an otherwise valid law
unconstitutional,3V2 and the legislative history of the RAVE Act is a

smoking gun. While this principle is particularly clear in
equal protection cases, 32 it pertains as well to the government's
impermissible purpose
in targeting all musical events featuring
329

electronic music.
While there may be some correlation between electronic dance
music and club drugs such as ecstasy, jazz, rock, blues and every other
modern genre of music have also included some measure of
characteristic drug use. 33° For example, in the 1920s, jazz was
associated with marijuana; in the 1960s, rock music with LSD; in the
1980s, punk music with speed. 331 Yet the government has never before
327. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(ordinance dealing with the ritual slaughter of animals did not have compelling
governmental interest which would justify the targeting of religious activities-the practice
of the Santeria religion-despite the city's claims that its interest lay in public health and
the prevention of cruelty to animals); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 471
(1982) ("despite its facial neutrality there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively
drawn for racial purposes"); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 293, at 776 ("The real function
of the O'Brien test is nothing other than ascertaining the law's purpose."); cf. Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) ("we have limited the applicability of O'Brien's
relatively lenient standard to those cases in which the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression."). Over twenty-five years ago, Paul Brest suggested
that O'Brien's real teaching, despite the Court's contrary language, was that "some
motives are unconstitutional." See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to
ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 590 (1975). Elena Kagan has made a
similar point not only about O'Brien, but about the entire structure of contemporary free
speech doctrine. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role Of
Governmental Motive In First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L REv. 413, 414 (1996)
("[N]otwithstanding the Court's protestations in O'Brien ... First Amendment law, as
developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though
unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.").
328. See Rubenfeld, supra note 293, at 775 n.17 (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982)) (striking down formally race-neutral law enacted by
statewide referendum where "despite its facial neutrality there is little doubt that the
initiative was effectively drawn for racial purposes" and that it was beyond reasonable
dispute that the initiative was enacted 'because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse
effects upon a racial minority); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Purpose of PurposeAnalysis,
107 YALE LJ. 2685 (1998).
329. Music is expression that is protected by the First Amendment. See supra note 266.
330. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants James
Estopinal's and Brian Brunet's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 23, U.S. v. Brunet
(E.D. La. 2001) (No. 01-010).
331. Id; see also FRANK TIRRO, JAZZ: A HISTORY 328 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993)
(Jazz has also been associated with heroin).
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suggested that the musical gathering be prohibited. 32 Law
enforcement historically and rightly focused on drug use and
3 rather than the associated music, dance or culture. All
distribution, 33
of this changed in 2001, when the Department of Justice declared a
goal of eliminating (to use the term it used)
law enforcement
"4raves,' 334 a term that includes both electronic music concerts (small
and large) and raves as they have been defined in this Article. 35
The name of the bill alone speaks volumes. While the acronym
RAVE stands for Reducing Americans' Vulnerability to Ecstasy,
testimony from government officials reveals that the government's
goal in passing the RAVE Act was not to reduce drug use alone but
to reduce drug use by eliminating the "raves" themselves. For
example, shortly after the indictment of the defendants in the State
Palace Theater case under the Crackhouse statute, DEA
Administrator Donnie R. Marshall testified before the Senate Caucus
on International Narcotics Control' 36 that "[r]aves, under any name,
are a lucrative business and are frequently the sites of crimes such as
pharmaceutical diversion, rape, property damage, gang violence, drug
sales, robberies, assaults, and murder." 337 He added that, "we are
hopeful that more investigations along the lines of the State Palace
38
Theater investigation will have an impact on shutting down raves.
Notably, he did not distinguish between legitimate electronic music
concerts and illegitimate raves (events where it is more likely that
drugs are present) as the events have been defined throughout this
Article. This indicates that the agency sought to eliminate all concerts
featuring electronic music, whether legitimate or not.
One can further ascertain the true objective behind the RAVE

332. See supra note 331.
333. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XVIII; the National Prohibition Acts, 41 Stat. 305
(1919); 42 Stat. 222 (1921); and 46 Stat. 1036 (1931) (making "manufacture, sale or
transportation of intoxicating liquors... for beverage purposes" a federal crime)
(repealed by U.S. CONST. XXI § 1); the Prohibition Repeal Act, 49 Stat. 872 (codified at
40 U.S.C. § 1306); the Crackhouse statute, which was designed to "outlaw operation of
houses or buildings (crackhouses) where crack, cocaine and other drugs are manufactured
and used." See 132 CONG. REc. 26,474 (1986) (excerpt of Senate Amendment No. 3034 to
H.R. 5484).
334. See infra note 339 (describing "Operation Rave Review" under the heading of
"Anti-Rave Initiatives").
335. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
336. America at Risk- The Ecstasy Threat: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on
InternationalNarcotics Control, 107th Cong. 33 (2001) (statement of Donnie R. Marshall,
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")).
337. Id.
338. Id.
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Act by reading the Department of Justice's pamphlet providing a
'how-to' guide for shutting down raves. 3 9 This bulletin, published by
the Department of Justice's National Drug Intelligence Center in

April 2001, called the State Palace Theater operation its most
successful anti-rave initiative. 3 ° It recommended a number of tactics
to attack raves, and although the purported goal of the carefully
crafted strategy is to deter ecstasy distribution, 34 the Department's
definition of "rave" centers on modes of expression-music, dance
and the visual arts. Between the time the RAVE Act was first
proposed in the Senate and the time it was actually passed, the bill's
sponsors had eliminated the controversial finding that "the trafficking
and use of 'club drugs' ... is deeply embedded in the rave culture."' 342
The government does not even maintain the pretense of targeting
drug use at raves but rather intends to eliminate the events
themselves.

3. Substantiality
Recall that the test from Broadrick343 requires that "particularly
where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." (emphasis
added).
If the legitimate sweep of the statute covers the government's
interest in battling the illegal street drug ecstasy, this covers some
electronic music concerts and most raves. 344 The statute's overbreadth
339. See Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't
of
Justice,
No.
2001-L0424-004,
April
2001,
at
1,
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
343. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
344. But eliminating raves and electronic music concerts probably does not do much to
help the government in its war on drugs, as drugs that were once considered
"underground" drugs for use at raves are now seen at "nightclubs, concerts, bars, college
campuses, shopping malls, and even schools." See CYNTHIA R. KNOWLES, UP ALL
NIGHT: A CLOSER LOOK AT CLUB DRUGS AND RAVE CULTURE vii (Red House Press
2001). See also Kim Kozlowski, Ecstasy Use Grows for Suburban Teens; Survey: It's
Almost As Common As Pot, DET. NEWS, Nov. 17, 2003, Special Report, available at
http://www.detnews.com/2003/specialreport/0311/18/aOl-326994.htm (last visited June 5,
2004), in which a staffer at an adolescent drug treatment center says one teenager told her,
"[T]hey were passing out ecstasy pills at her senior prom like they were after-dinner
breath mints." Id Rich Isaacson, special agent for the DEA, says that when he talks to
parents, he tries to debunk the myth that ecstasy is a rave drug. Id. He says, "It's a
common drug now wherever teens have a house party. If there is marijuana or alcohol, I
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is both real and substantial because on its face, the law can eliminate
not only all electronic music concerts and all raves, but rock concerts
(like the one planned for Billings), all musical concerts, political
rallies, and any other type of event one can imagine provided that
there is even the remotest possibility of illegal drug use at the event.
C. The Rationale of The Disorderly House Does Not Translate to
the Rave Situation 5

The rationale of the disorderly house3 is inapplicable to the rave
situation because, as noted in the Introduction, there are two types of
events: 1) the regulated electronic music concert, typically held in a
nightclub (but sometimes in a larger venue such as an arena); and 2)
the true rave, which is unregulated, held in an open space and is an

event of a grand scale. A disorderly house statute fits neither of these
situations, because an electronic music concert is not disorderly and a
rave, because of its size, could never be held in a house.
The electronic music concert is orderly. It is organized for profit,
under the security and protective measures implemented by the event
promoter, in a venue where the business owner has taken out the
necessary permits under local law 34 7 and does not want to be held

liable for the acts of his clients.3 Unlike the crackhouse owner, who
is usually an absentee landlord turning a blind eye to what is

happening within the crackhouse, the nightclub property owner is
usually on the premises or nearby;349 he usually hires an event

would have every expectancy that [e]cstasy would be there, too." Id
345. A disorderly conduct statute, on the other hand, that would (for example) make it
unlawful to fail to disperse in response to a valid police order might be more appropriate
for the rave situation. Compare City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)
(unconstitutionally overbroad disorderly conduct statute) with Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104 (1972) (constitutional and narrowly tailored disorderly conduct statute). See infra
Part XI.A for an illustration of how England drafted a disorderly conduct statute that was
narrowly tailored to its rave situation.
346. See supra Part III.B.
347. See supra note 20.

348. See Press Release, supranote 191:
Business owners have come to Congress and told us there are only so many steps
they can take to prevent any of the thousands of people who may attend a
concert or a rave from using drugs, and they are worried about being held
personally accountable for the illegal acts of others ....
Id.
349. See Hearing on HR. 5519, supra note 21. According to Boyd,

Robert Brunet manages the State Palace Theater in New Orleans... Mr. Brunet
hired James Estopinal to arrange and promote electronic music concerts-what
the government refers to as "raves" but which are nothing more than musical
exhibitions at which disc jockeys (DJ's) perform computer-generated electronic
music for a crowd of dancers ....
The prosecution in this case made no claim that
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manager to take active steps to ensure the safety of those on the
premisesY9 The State Palace Theater owners, for example, instituted
a zero-tolerance policy"' that absolutely forbid possessing, selling or
using drugs on the premises,352 and they announced this policy by
posting signs throughout the venue. The owners also offered free
concert tickets to anyone who turned in a person with drugs.353 State
Palace Theater security guards refused to admit people who appeared
to be intoxicated.3 Over the past several years, the owners arranged
for many arrests due to their zero-tolerance policy, including the
arrests of security guards who were found to be selling drugs.355
Though DEA agents purchased alleged drugs from 82 different
people, almost half of the purchases did not test positive as a
controlled substance.3 The agents did not pursue investigations or
prosecutions for any of these sales at the State Palace.357 The usual
method of arresting the drug dealers themselves was abandoned (in
this context, at least) in favor of the easier route of pursuing the
businessmen who provide the music that some drug users and nondrug users alike find entertaining.3
While the maintenance of a place for use, manufacture or
distribution of controlled substances did not have to be the sole or
any of these men ever engaged in any drug related activity whatsoever. DEA
officials have implied in other Congressional hearings that the State Palace
proprietors somehow condoned or encouraged drug use. This is not the case, nor
was any such claim ever made in the actual State Palace case .... Id.
350. Id.
351. Id
352. Id
353. See Reducing Americans' Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of 2002: Hearing on H.
5519 Before the House Subcomn. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm on the Judiciary,107th Cong. 3 (2002) (testimony of Graham Boyd, Director, Drug
Policy Litigation Project, American Civil Liberties Union).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. Likewise, the Club La Vela in Panama City, Florida, was another venue that
was singled out as a place that held raves and, by implication, distributed drugs. Brothers
and co-owners Patrick Pfeffer (CEO) and Thorsten Pfeffer (General Manager) were
charged with conspiring to use the club, or allow it to be used, for the use and distribution
of drugs. Assistant U.S. Attorney Greg Miller failed to provide any evidence that the
Pfeffer brothers conspired to engage in drug sales at the club or negligently allowed drug
sales to take place there. Defense attorney Todd Foster argued that the club earned its
revenues in legitimate ways, grossing $2.5 million in alcohol sales and $3.2 million in cover
charges the previous year. See Feds Lose "Crack House" Case Against FloridaRave Club
Owners,
Drug
War
Chronicle,
at
http://www.stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/213/clublavela.shtml (last visited June 5, 2004).
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main purpose of the premises, it had to be a significant purpose for
prosecution under the Crackhouse statute. 9 The primary purpose of
a concert hall or nightclub is to provide entertainment, not to
maintain a disorderly house where people know they can go to
consume or sell hard drugs. As Senator Grassley stated in his remarks
supporting the RAVE Act: "Clearly, taking steps to reduce or
eliminate drug use at an event, such as the posting of signs or through
zero-tolerance instructions to security personnel, are not actions that
would be taken by someone who would intentionally allow drug use
to occur at an event. '"360 Yet people who did take these steps, like the
owners of the State Palace Theater, who had histories of cooperating
with law enforcement on combating drug use and distribution, were
the first targets of the DEA in "Operation RAVE Review." They
were prosecuted under the old Crackhouse statute and could be
prosecuted under today's RAVE Act.
Another reason why a disorderly house statute does not pertain
to the rave situation is that the knowledge of the property
owner/maintainer in each situation is inherently different. Recall that
unregulated raves are, by definition, large-scale events. Recall too
that the Crackhouse statute applied only to a "building, room or an
enclosure."' 1 The RAVE Act, on the other hand, applies to "any
place." 36 While courts have recognized that the natural inference is
that those who live in a house with others have sufficient knowledge
of what is going on inside, particularly in the common areas, to satisfy
the knowledge requirement of the former Crackhouse statute Section
(a)(2), 363 this inference is not readily apparent with respect to largescale raves. Nor is this inference apparent with respect to those
electronic music concerts held in arenas, where the event in question
may consist of tens of thousands of attendees. The natural inference
with both the large-scale electronic music concert and the large-scale
rave is that someone hosting such a large event would not know of,
and could not possibly be held responsible for, the activities of
everyone present.w
Many disorderly house statutes have been challenged on
Constitutional grounds, usually with charges of vagueness. These
359. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
360. 149 CONG. REC. S1679 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
361. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (1986).

362. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2003).
363. See supra notes 159-60.
364. See supra note 25.
365. See supra note 348.
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statutes have been upheld, mainly because the scienter requirement
included in the statutes allows a court to interpret the statute
narrowly, thus avoiding constitutional difficulties. 366 The same cannot
be said of an overbroad statute such as the RAVE Act, as an
overbroad statute by definition is one that is not narrowly tailored
and does not lend itself to a narrowing construction by the judicial
branch. 367
VII. Policy Considerations
Electronic music concerts and raves both raise a fairly typical
concern within the local community: noise, at late hours. Noise and
event regulations are typically left up to local government,36 and
many local governments have already enacted local ordinances
designed to eliminate the undesirable side effects of large parties, like
noise, rather than the event itself.
A. The Federal Government Should Defer to Local Government on
This Issue
Chicago, Illinois is one large city that passed a city ordinance in
May 2001 that would make building owners and managers
responsible for after-hours clubs and parties held on the property and
could send them to jail for up to six months.6 9
In the South, responding to club owners' concerns, politicians in
Charlotte, North Carolina, began tinkering in 2000 with that city's
proposed rave ordinance.37 ° The ordinance, drawn up by the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg police, aims to control drug sales and use at
nightclubs by restricting clubs' hours of operation and requiring a
permit to operate the club. The trend for local government to address
366. As to the power of a court to construe a criminal statute generally, see 21 AM.
JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 18 (2004).
367. See supra Part VII.A.
368. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (noise
restriction prohibiting yelling, shouting, or screaming that would substantially interfere
with the provision of medical services including counseling at an abortion clinic was not
barred by the First Amendment); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)
(municipal noise regulation, designed to ensure that musical performances in a public
band shell did not disturb the surrounding residents by requiring performers to use a
sound system and sound technician provided by the city, was valid); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (discussing the validity, under the federal constitution, of federal, state and
local anti-noise laws and regulations).
369. See Ray Long & Rick Pearson, City, State, Take Aim at Raves , CHI. TRIBUNE,
May 3, 2001, at Metro 3.
370. Lauren Markoe, Council Views Revised Rave Rules Following Input From Club
Owners, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Dec. 21, 2000, at 3B.
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this issue has also reached the west coast. In San Bernardino,
California, in 2001, the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors
unanimously approved modifications to the County Development
Code affecting Temporary Special Event permits, resulting in
increased requirements for sponsors of special events, including music
events. 371 Seattle's "teen dance ordinance" requires minors to be
accompanied to dances by a parent.3
Overall, these local ordinances are based on event and venue
permits, and focus on ensuring that the venues are licensed. These are
all rational goals and well within the state's police power to regulate
the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. These local regulations
are not unconstitutional because they do not purport to eliminate all
events associated with a particular genre of music.
B. The RAVE Act May Have Driven Electronic Music Concerts
Underground
As the Boise experience with electronic music concerts
demonstrates, 3 examined in Part IV above, the RAVE Act may have
driven the forum for electronic music underground. This is a serious
problem, because young people who want to hear electronic music
will be forced to go to underground events held in unlicensed
establishments where there may not be clean facilities, access to fresh
water, or medical personnel on hand in case of an emergency. Thus,
the RAVE Act may have 374
ironically harmed some of the very people
protect.
to
intended
was
it
VIII. Suggestions For Improvements
A. Tailor the Statute With Specific Definitions
The main constitutional defect with the RAVE Act is its
overbreadth. However, an overbreadth problem can be cured 375 if the
371. Press Release, County of San Bernardino, Board Honors Randolph, Controls
Raves and Helps Seniors (June 26, 2001), available at http://www.co.sanbemardino.ca.us/pressreleases/docs/1816-26-OlSupervisorsmeetingsummary.doc.htm
(last
visited June 8, 2004).
372. Eliscu, supra note 6, at 22.
373. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
374. See Hearing on HR. 5519 supra note 21, at 48 (statement of Graham Boyd,
Director, Drug Policy Litigation Project, American Civil Liberties Union, predicting what
he called this "perverse effect").
375. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989) (the overbreadth challenge
to the statute in question was rendered moot when the Massachusetts legislature amended
the statute).
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legislature narrowly tailors the statute so that it addresses
constitutionally valid goals while avoiding the chilling effect that is
the hallmark of an overbroad statute. The main defect with the
RAVE Act is that it does not include definitions that would tailor the
statute to the government's stated objective. Since England has prior
experience with "rave culture" and remedial laws curtailing this
phenomenon, examining the English policy with respect to raves is
helpful.
"By the early '90s, the Tory government, the police, the tabloid
press and middle England had all had enough of rave culture."3 76

Consequently, the government passed the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act-a disorderly conduct statute. England's law provides
many and varied legal definitions, including one for a rave, defined as
"a gathering of 100 or more persons (whether or not trespassers) at
which amplified music is played during the night (with or without
intermissions) and is such as, by reason of its loudness and duration
and the time at which it is played, is likely to cause serious distress to
the inhabitants of the locality; .... " The statute goes on to define
rave music as "sounds wholly or predominantly characterized by the
emission of a succession of repetitive beats." 378 The statute also
provides definitions for "entertainment license," "exempt person,"
"land in the open air," "local authority," "occupier," "trespasser" and
"vehicle." If Congress had included statutory definitions like these3 79
that distinguished between legitimate electronic music concerts and
illegitimate events like raves, it could have averted the RAVE Act's
overbreadth problem. Similarly, when the city of Detroit 3Wsought to
amend its 1962 "Anti-Skid Row" ordinance, to include adult movie
theaters and bookstores in its law to prevent the aggregation of such
1 the city council members included a very specific
establishmentsY3
376. See The History ofRaves, availableat
http://www.thesite.org/drinkanddrugs/drugculture/drugstrade/thehistoryofrave (last visited
Nov. 20,2005) (overview of the rise and fall of the "rave culture" in England).
377. 33 Eng. Code §§ 63-65 (1994), available in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 1434-38
(4th ed. 1997).
378. Id. at § 63(1)(b).
379. Id. at § 63(10).
380. Incidentally, The House and the Senate passed a resolution in 2001 as part of
Detroit's tricentennial that congratulated the city for (among other things) helping to
pioneer techno, the electronic dance music played at raves. See David Montgomery,
Ravers Against the Machine; Partiersand ACLU take on 'Ecstasy' Legislation, WASH.
POST, July 18,2002, at El.
381. The goal of the ordinance was to prohibit one such movie theater or bookstore
from operating within 1000 feet of another such establishment, or within 500 feet of any
residential area. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976).
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definition of the types of establishments that should be considered
"adult." The Detroit Common Council was attempting to prevent
concentrations of such businesses, as these clusters tend to attract an
"undesirable quantity and quality of transients." The same charges
have been directed at raves. Because of the explicit drafting,
Detroit's amended ordinance was able to survive facial challenges
that the statute was too vague and that it violated First Amendment
rights.?
These two examples demonstrate how beneficial it is for a statute
to be drafted with precision. The RAVE Act would certainly benefit
from a more concrete description of what a rave is, including how
many people are required to be in attendance, better descriptions of
what places may be considered undesirable for holding a rave, as well
as better guidelines for law enforcement personnel. 3 The English law
provides guidance to American legislators in these respects.

382. See id. at 53 n.5 (1976). The city defined three types of adult establishments as the
following:

Adult Book Store: an establishment having as a substantial or significant portion
of its stock in trade, books, magazines, and other periodicals which are
distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing
or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,' (as
defined below), or an establishment with a segment or section devoted to the sale
or display of such material.
Adult Motion Picture Theater: an enclosed building with a capacity of 50 or more
persons used for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual
Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,' (as defined below) for observation
by patrons therein.
Adult Mini Motion Picture Theater: an enclosed building with a capacity for less
than 50 persons used for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual
Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,' (as defined below), for observation
by patrons therein.
Id
383. See,

e.g.,

Michael

S.

Scott,

Rave

Parties, Mar.

7,

2002,

at

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/el2Oll4O6.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (lists drug
overdoses and associated medical hazards, drug trafficking and the potential for violence
associated with it, noise (from rave music, crowds and traffic), driving under the influence
and traffic control and parking congestion as rave-related concerns for police).
384. Young, 427 U.S. at 61.

385. Recall that after the cancellation of the Billings NORML event, DEA
headquarters had to furnish all of the field officers with clarification as to how the law
should be enforced. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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B. Include a Safe Harbor for Legitimate Business Owners
Congress should include a safe harbor for business owners who
wish to provide entertainment featuring electronic music in a licensed

venue.
Senator Biden, the staunchest proponent of the RAVE Act, has
said that the purpose of the law is not to prosecute law-abiding club
owners. 38 But if prosecutions under the RAVE Act follow the pattern
of prosecutions under its predecessor, the Crackhouse statute, more
business owners than "rogue" rave promoters will be punished. The
majority of prosecutions that were conducted under the Crackhouse
statute fell under Section (a)(1), where the owner's purpose is the
relevant purpose.387 Only a few Crackhouse prosecutions fell under
Section (a)(2),' where the purpose of the people using the place-in
the electronic music concert or rave context, the event promoters-is
the relevant one. Senator Leahy withdrew his support from the
RAVE Act precisely because he felt the law did not include sufficient
protections for legitimate business owners, whose liability under the
RAVE Act has now been "dramatically increase[d]. 389
Law-abiding business owners who take reasonable precautions to
prevent incidental drug use on their premises need protection. One
journalist has described club owners' precautionary measures as more
thorough than an airport security check. 390 The owners of the State
Palace Theater went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the State
Palace Theater's zero tolerance policy regarding drugs was
enforced.' 9' Despite all these precautions, they were the first venue
holding electronic music concerts to392 be prosecuted under the
Crackhouse statute for holding "raves.
These club owners should not be punished when they are taking
reasonable steps to prevent drug use, as they are not in a position to
guarantee that the premises are drug-free. Small business owners
need a safe harbor from the RAVE Act that lets them know what

386. See supra note 258.
387. See generally Richard Belfiore, Annotation, Validity, Construction and
Application of Federal "Crack-House Statute" Criminalizing Maintaining Place for
Purpose of Making, Distributing, or Using Controlled Drugs (21 U.S.C.A. § 856), 116
A.LR. FED. 345 (1993).
388. Id.
389. See supra note 191.
390. Neva Chonin, Congress Acts Out Against Club Culture, S.F. CHRON., April 27,
2003 (Sunday Datebook), at 35.
391. See supra notes 352-56 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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they can do to prevent prosecution and gives them criteria to know

what reasonable measures Congress thinks they should take. This safe
harbor should extend to property owners who keep their premises in
conformance with local operating ordinances, cooperate with the
local authorities like police and who take reasonable precautions such
as hiring medical and security personnel to ensure the safety of those
on the premises.
IX. Conclusion
While the deaths of young people experimenting with the street

drug ecstasy are indisputably tragic, the RAVE Act is a knee-jerk
reaction to those occurrences. Here in the United States, it appears
that Congress has formulated its policies based on flawed science, and
this has led to a media circus. As noted in Part II.A.2 above, the

government

only recently

allowed scientific

experiments

for

legitimate uses of MDMA to proceed, although scientists have long

lauded its potential for use in psychotherapy. It concluded that the
drug had no medical value, based on scientific studies that are

questionable at best and, at times, seriously flawed.3 3 It has
exaggerated the statistics on how many deaths street ecstasy has
caused, in both New Orleans and the state of Florida, 394 to justify the
draconian RAVE Act. 39' The federal government should focus less on

eliminating electronic music concerts and more on how to prevent
distribution of the street drug ecstasy within this country.
393. For excellent critiques of the flaws in the government's scientific data, see
ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE, supra note 9, at 333-35 and KNOWLES, supra note 344,

at 5-7.
394. See supranotes 62-63 and accompanying text for the figures from the State Palace
Theater case. The venue's capacity was 3,500; 400 teenagers over the course of two years
were allegedly treated at local emergency rooms for overdosing on drugs, yet the
government later stipulated at trial that only 30-40 overdoses may have been related to the
events held at the State Palace Theater. Id. During the summer of 1999, authorities across
Florida began an initiative to raid raves and dance parties, and announced that club drugs
had been responsible for 254 deaths statewide. See KNOWLES, supranote 344, at 5-7. This
shocking number was later refuted as grossly inaccurate. Id. A more accurate number,
reported by medical examiners in the Drug Abuse Warning Network ("DAWN") report,
is that ecstasy caused 27 deaths nationwide between 1994 and 1998. Id. Together, all drugrelated emergency room episodes represent only 0.6% of all emergency room visits, or less
than one percent, and mentions of club drugs are "truly rare events." Id.
395. Compare KNOWLES, supra note 344, at 5-7, with the government's data, available
at https://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs/mepubs/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). In the most
current government statistics, the most frequently mentioned causes of those drug-related
ER visits are alcohol-in-combination and cocaine. Ecstasy ranks seventh out of fourteen
listed drugs.
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The RAVE Act is unconstitutional because its overbreadth has a
real and substantial impact on First Amendment rights. The RAVE
Act is inequitable, on public policy grounds, to those legitimate
business owners who provide a forum for electronic music and dance
(protected forms of expression) but cannot guarantee that their
properties are completely drug-free. These business owners are better
regulated at the local level. The RAVE Act may also have the
disturbing effect of causing more harm than good, by driving
electronic music concerts underground and creating the very
environment it was intended to eliminate.
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